The Management Function of Ocean Boundaries by Beauchamp, Kenneth P.
The Management Function of Ocean
Boundaries
KENNETH P. BEAUCHAMP*
Advances in ocean technology, growing requirements for marine
resources, and an increasing number of ocean users, have created
the need for a functional and managerial approach to the ex-
ploitation of offshore resources and the use of ocean space. The
boundaries which man has set in the ocean have generally inhib-
ited such a development because they carry with them an idea of
separation, or divisiveness, which has been transported from land
boundary concepts. This Article concerns the nature of maritime
boundaries and their changing function in the ordering of human
activities in the marine environment.
INTRODUCTION
[A]s soon as one starts to conceptualize human phenomena in a spatial
framework, one finds and sets boundaries, since there is a logical and psy-
chological necessity to break down the immense unbounded chaos of reality
into a number of definite categories that are separated and distinguished by
boundaries.'
The world ocean is a clearly identifiable system. A system is de-
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fined as a "regularly interacting or interdependent group of items
forming a unified whole."' 2 The world ocean is a complex system
comprised not only of the natural marine processes and resources,
but also of the various human uses and governing authorities. A dis-
tinct interrelationship exists between the natural components of the
ocean system-the physical, geological, chemical and biological sub-
systems which link the seabed, water column, surface waters, and, in
polar regions, the ice cover. The physical components contain various
resources and accommodate different activities. Some uses such as
transportation, are in themselves potentially hazardous to the marine
environment; other uses, such as the fishery, depend on long-term
environmental quality and are subject to negative impact from vessel
traffic and seabed exploration. Moreover, distinct interrelationships
exist between uses as well-interrelationships raising such questions
as navigational safety in sea lanes near areas of the continental shelf
used for petroleum exploration, and the effects of industrial, military
and residential waste dump sites or nearby commercial and recrea-
tional fishing areas. In this sense, the ocean can be described as an
"open system" in which the component physical parts and some uses
are fluid and mobile in nature, and where oceanographic phenomena
cross many man-made boundaries. Linear division of ocean space,
therefore, is operationally impossible.
Nevertheless, the concept of ocean boundaries, by which coastal
states define their areas of exclusive or semi-exclusive jurisdiction,
has been linear and spatial in nature. Early coastal-state maritime
jurisdiction was geographically narrow and asserted mainly for con-
trol of surface uses. Beyond the coastal areas, where the ocean is
common property in the greater expanse of high seas, the early uses
of the ocean-fishing and maritime transportation-developed unim-
peded by boundaries or regulations. These circumstances occasioned
relatively few offshore boundary disputes.
After World War II, however, a realization that land-based en-
ergy resources were finite, and increasing doubt as to the capacity of
the land to sustain a growing population, motivated new interest in
the potential of the ocean. This was accompanied by technological
advances which gave coastal states and maritime nations an unprece-
dented capability to explore and exploit. A new era of ocean use had
begun; in particular, the last two decades have witnessed an expan-
sion in the traditional uses of the ocean with the growth of new ac-
tivities in marine areas never before utilized. Additionally, as the
competition for ocean resources has intensified, the growing number
of developing nations, along with the industrial nations, seek to ex-
tend their maritime jurisdiction.
2. D. CLELLAND & W. KING, MANAGEMENT A SYSTEMS APPROACH 31 (1972).
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The interrelationships between these events were not accounted for
in the separate conventions resulting from the United Nations Con-
ference on the Law of the Sea held at Geneva in 1958 (UNCLOS
I).3 A response to this situation was the demand in 1967 by Ambas-
sador Pardo of Malta, on behalf of the developing nations, for the
ocean to be declared the "common heritage of mankind. Partly as a
result of this idea, the Third United Nations Conference on the Law
of the Sea (UNCLOS III) was convened in 1974.' The aim was to
achieve what the earlier conference had not achieved-an equitable
allocation of ocean space, resources, and management authority
among the world community. Due in part to acquisitive and nation-
alistic attitudes, however, the provisions of the current treaty6 are a
much modified version of the management approach proposed in
1967. There is no mystery to this similarity, since nation-states,
based on the concept of sovereignty and territorial boundaries, are
unwilling or unable to implement cooperative ocean management on
a global or regional basis.7
In this new era of ocean use, however, the primary national moti-
vation to extend offshore jurisdiction is based on the value of re-
sources rather than on requirements of national security and defense.
Negotiated boundary delimitations already have begun to reflect this
economic interest in international relations through the use of dual
boundaries and common resource development zones. The movement
3. The conventions resulting from the First United Nations Conference on the
Law of the Sea [hereinafter cited as UNCLOS I] were: Convention on the Continental
Shelf, done Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 471, T.I.A.S. No. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 311 [herein-
after cited as Continental Shelf Convention]; Convention on the Territorial Sea and the
Contiguous Zone, done Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S.
205 [hereinafter cited as Territorial Sea Convention]; Convention on the High Seas,
done Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82 [hereinafter
cited as High Seas Convention]; and Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the
Living Resources of the High Seas, done Apr. 29, 1958, 17 U.S.T. 138, T.I.A.S. No.
5969, 559 U.N.T.S. 285 [hereinafter cited as Fishing and Conservation Convention].
4. Pardo proposed that the United Nations General Assembly declare both the
seabed and the ocean floor and its resources as the "common heritage of mankind,"
Pardo also proposed that the Assembly take the necessary steps to embody this basic
principle in an internationally binding document. U.N. Doc. A/6695(1967).
5. The resulting treaty was the United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea, done Dec. 10, 1982, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/122, reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 1261
(1982) [hereinafter cited as LOS Convention].
6. Id.
7. At first impression, the value of a boundary might appear to lie in its defini-
tiveness. A more complete appreciation, however, might be summed up in the foreword
to S. BOGGS, INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARIES (1940): "The chief defect of any boundary is
its definitiveness, a quality that is indispensable in the modem world with almost every
square mile of land occupied or desirable for production or site."
toward 200 nautical mile resource or economic zones, and the exten-
sion of territorial seas to twelve nautical miles, will give rise to terri-
torial or resource conflicts between most of the world's coastal na-
tions. 8 It is, therefore, not surprising that the issues relating to
maritime boundary delimitation were among the most difficult en-
countered at UNCLOS III.
The rules or principles for delimiting maritime boundaries con-
tained in the 1958 Geneva Conventions and in the third party adju-
dications since that date have not been changed by the current
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOS Conven-
tion) provisions.9 What the provisions do change, however, is the in-
ternational juridical framework for asserting national jurisdiction by
creating a sufficiently broad multifunctional economic zone within
which coastal states can control ocean activities. Because of the di-
versity of these activities and the complexity of the interrelationships
among them, territorial claims and linear concepts of boundaries
cannot meet the managerial requirements which accompany the ex-
panded areas of coastal-state jurisdiction. The LOS Convention pro-
visions for a 200-mile functional jurisdiction for limited purposes re-
quire that the delimitation, demarcation, and administration of
maritime boundaries be viewed in new dimensions in order to arrive
at methods and criteria for adequately defining limits in ocean space
which will accommodate and prioritize human activities within the
unified ocean system.
This Article will discuss the nature of spatial and functional zones
in the ocean as they relate to the purpose of coastal-state and inter-
national jurisdictions. The Article presents a view of ocean bounda-
ries which, under the new international order imposed upon ocean
use and control, might overcome the problem of incongruity between
political boundaries and the physical realities of the ocean system,
CATEGORIES AND FUNCTIONS OF OCEAN BOUNDARIES
The first conception of a boundary is likely to be that of a line
drawn with some exactitude on a map, or a physical demarcation on
the surface of the land. In fact, most international land boundaries
are represented in such manner and act as the visible limit of a
state's sovereign jurisdiction.10 Though conceptually acting as a ver-
8. Smith, A Geographical Primer to Maritime Boundary-Making, 12 OCEAN
DEv. & INT'L L.J. 1, 2 (1982). The author calculates that under the 200 mile regime
every coastal state will be faced with an area of potential overlap with at least one neigh-
boring state.
9. LOS Convention, supra note 5, arts. 15, 26, para. 1, & 83, para. I.
10. Mankind in his different social groupings always has demanded some form of
separation from other groups-although the primitive idea of a boundary was that of a
zone rather than a line, and the term frontier, meaning in front of, was given to the
unclaimed and unsettled zones separating areas of inhabited territory. N. POUNDS, PO-
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tical plane, land boundaries are linear in nature; they generally can
be demarcated easily on the ground to show clear territorial and ju-
risdictional limits. Land boundaries, however, normally raise the is-
sue of territoriality between two parties only where historical title
and the division between race, religion or nationality have estab-
lished the line of separation.
Maritime boundary-making raises issues additional to those char-
acteristic of boundary-making on land. The nature of maritime
boundaries is necessarily zonal in several dimensions. More impor-
tantly, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) indicated in the 1951
Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries case, maritime boundaries have an inter-
national character:
The delineation of sea areas has always an international aspect; it cannot be
dependent merely upon the will of the coastal state as expressed in its mu-
nicipal law. Although it is true that the act of delimitation is necessarily a
unilateral act, because only the coastal state is competent to undertake it,
the validity of the delimitation with regard to other states depends upon
international law."1
For delimitation purposes, the creation of a zone offshore involves
a consideration of three factors: (1) the basis from which to measure
the seaward limits; (2) the seaward limit; and (3) the lateral limit
between opposite or adjacent states. The outward edge of the sea-
ward limit of the zone creates a boundary with the international
community, unless as in a narrow body of the sea, delimitation be-
tween opposite states does not leave an area of high seas. Another
zonal dimension of a maritime boundary exists because the surface
and water column in the ocean can have a different legal status than
the seabed and subsoil. For example, an offshore lateral boundary
between two states in the territorial sea would cut vertically through
the surface, water column, seabed, subsoil and airspace, while the
same boundary on the continental shelf would cut through only the
seabed and subsoil. On land, international boundaries delimit territo-
rial sovereignty for all purposes; in the ocean, boundaries must also
determine the limited sovereign rights corresponding to the legal sta-
tus of the maritime zone as well.12
LITICAL GEOGRAPHY 7 (1963); Kristoff, The Nature of Frontiers and Boundaries, 49
ANNALS A. AM. GEOG. 269-82 (1959). See generally Hall, The International Frontier,
42 AM. J. INT'L L. 42 (1948).
11. Fisheries (U.K. v. Nor.), 1951 I.C.J. 116, 132 [hereinafter cited as Anglo-
Norwegian Fisheries].
12. Regarding the demarcation of maritime boundaries, however, with the excep-
tion of a shoreline base, neither seaward limits nor lateral boundaries can be demarcated
in a practical manner--even though technology makes possible a linear demarcation of
Prior to UNCLOS III, the zones which international law recog-
nized as falling within coastal state jurisdiction were internal waters,
territorial seas, contiguous zones and the continental shelf.' 3 The
limits to the zones, however, never were clearly established, and were
the subject of varying state practices. UNCLOS III, as well as re-
cent state practice, has added a new type of ocean zone-either mul-
tifunctional, such as the proposed exclusive economic zone (EEZ), or
unifunctional, such as an exclusive fishing zone. A review of mari-
time boundary-making, therefore, involves a consideration of the fol-
lowing: (1) the baseline for measuring seaward limits; (2) the limits
of internal waters; (3) the seaward limits of the territorial sea, con-
tiguous zone, continental shelf, and the various functional zones; and
(4) the lateral boundaries between opposite and adjacent states.
Though the development of maritime boundary-making has re-
solved many of the associated technical problems, there are many
issues left to be resolved of a political, legal, and conceptual nature.
14
A large body of jurisprudence regarding maritime boundaries has
not yet developed nor have political geographers treated the matter
of offshore boundaries at the theoretical level at which they have
accorded land boundaries. Nonetheless, before considering the na-
ture or function of ocean boundaries, it is important to look at both
the existing legal frame of reference and the current matters of
practice.
The current legal frame of reference ig found in state practice
prior to 1945, the Truman Proclamation on the Continental Shelf of
1945,'15 the 1958 Geneva Conventions on the Law of the Sea,'" and
the subsequent rulings of both the ICJ and the Court of Arbitra-
tion. 17 Much understanding can also be gained from a review of the
deliberations of the International Law Commission (ILC) in the
1950s, and from the commentaries and proposals by various states
leading up to the drafting of the 1958 Conventions. 18 The develop-
ment of a theory of boundary-making also is influenced by practice
arising out of negotiated agreements between states subsequent to
limits through buoys and range marks on shore, as well as bottom anchored or implanted
electronic and acoustic devices.
13. See generally supra note 3.
14. See generally Hodgson & Cooper, The Technical Delimitation of a Modern
Equidistant Boundary, 3 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L.J. 361 (1975-76).
15. Proclamation No. 2667, 3 C.F.R. 67 (1945), reprinted in 59 Stat. 884 (1945).
16. See supra note 3.
17. See infra notes 200-05 and accompanying text.
18. The ILC was established by the United Nations to study, debate, and pro-
mote the development and codification of international law. Its members were elected by
the General Assembly. Refer, for examples, to Summary Records of the 39th Meeting,
[1950] 1 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1950; see also Rhee, Sea
Boundary Delimitation Between States Before World War II, 76 AM. J. INT'L L. 555-88
(1982) (an excellent review of the debate prior to 1945).
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the Conventions, and by the trend toward claiming unifunctional or
multifunctional resource zones, a practice now reflected in the exclu-
sive economic zone (EEZ) provisions of the LOS Convention.19
A complete study of boundaries from a theoretical viewpoint
should consider the types of maritime boundaries and their func-
tions, the methods by which they are delimited, and the process of
delimitation. For purposes of this Article, however, discussion will
center on type and function. It is suggested that boundaries in the
ocean are of two main categories-spatial 0 or functional 2 1 -in the
sense that they define spatial or functional areas or zones recognized
in international law. The criteria for each of these categories is
found in the legal framework referred to immediately above and
which will be discussed further in this Article. A third boundary cat-
egory, although a sub-category of functional boundaries, exists which
is sufficiently distinctive at this point to be mentioned separately.
These can be termed resource administration boundaries.22 These
boundaries are established for purposes of joint management of re-
sources by two or more states in transboundary regions. The criteria
for these boundaries do not yet have a clear validity in international




As nation-states first began competing for the use of the ocean,
location and space were the significant factors in boundary determi-
nation. Competition took on extreme proportions when the great sea
powers of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries claimed whole oceans,
and it remained extreme when the first maritime boundaries were
drawn about the shallow coastal belts on the basis of contiguity. Na-
tions had to know where their limits of sovereignty lay. Within the
first spatially located and bounded area of the ocean-the territorial
sea-within "cannon-shot" range, a coastal nation could control fish-
ing activities, defend its shores, and organize its ports and customs
systems.2
19. LOS Convention, supra note 5, arts. 55-75.
20. See infra text accompanying notes 23-85.
21. See infra text accompanying notes 86-199.
22. See infra text accompanying notes 172-99.
23. Out of the religious and political strife culminating in the Reformation was
born the legal and political concept of territorial sovereignty, which became central to
Spatial boundaries are those which define or set apart certain
physical areas of the globe along political lines; in international law,
spatial boundaries are lines of demarcation between different legal
systems.24 It has been suggested that there is a psychological need in
man to draw sharp boundaries.25 Historically, the pattern of state
acquisition of territory has been to proclaim sovereign control for all
purposes over artificially determined spatial entities. This was the
basis for the theory of land boundary delimitation, and it has been
described as "tribunalistic in form, and sectional in its effect, bring-
ing out the divisiveness of the human race."28 Thus, when men ven-
tured to claim specific areas of the ocean, the theory that coastal
waters were a continuation of the adjoining state and therefore sub-
ject to its sovereignty supported their acquisitions.27
The attitudes towards maritime boundary-making and the current
legal frame of reference were crystallized at a time when man's fo-
cus on the ocean as territory was limited to the nearby coastal wa-
ters. This area of the ocean was subject to very few, but very defini-
tive, claims, such as security, transportation, and fishing.28 The
functions of a maritime boundary at that point were relatively sim-
ple-the initial attitude towards maritime boundary concepts derived
in large part from land-based practice. This idea of the dominance of
the land over the adjacent ocean areas has always governed man's
perspective of the ocean. As stated in the Anglo-Norwegian Fisher-
ies case, "[i]t is the land which confers upon the coastal state a right
to the waters off its coast."
29
Because states are territorial organizations, the interactions are es-
the nationalist movement. For a concise review of this period in the seventeenth century,
see J. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 1-40 (6th ed. 1963). The concept of sovereignty
was considered by the arbitrator in Island of Palmas (U.S. v. Neth.) 2 R. Int'l Arb.
Awards 829, 838 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1928), reprinted in 22 AM. J. INT'L L. 867, 875
(1928): "Sovereignty in the relations between States signifies independence. Indepen-
dence in regard to a portion of the globe is the right to exercise therein, to the exclusion
of any other State, the functions of a State."
24. See Spykman, Frontiers, Security and International Organizations, 32 GEO-
GRAPHICAL REV. 436 (1942). Attaining stability and finality in relations between states
is one of the primary objects of international boundary-making. For a discussion of this
principle of boundary delimitation, see Concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambo-
dia v. Thailand), 1962 I.C.J. 4, 34 (Judgment of June 15); see also S. SHARMA. INTER-
NATIONAL BOUNDARY DISPUTES AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (1976).
25. Strassoldo, supra note 1, at 85.
26. See J. GOTTMAN, THE SIGNIFICANCE OF TERRITORY (1973).
27. The principle of the freedom of the seas had been confirmed by the beginning
of the nineteenth century following the debate between the famous publicists, Hugo Gro-
tius and John Seldon. Although the Grotius argument prevailed, the idea was conceived
that the sea, along with the land, was susceptible to private ownership. Moreover, the
concept of a maritime belt around the coast also emerged from the debate. Notably, the
term "territorial sea" was coined by an Italian lawyer, Alberico Gentili in 1605. See
Fenn, Origins of the Theory of Territorial Waters, 20 AM. J. INT'L L. 465, 478 (1926).
28. C.J. COLOMBOS, INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 147-68 (6th ed. 1972).
29. Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries, 1951 I.C.J. at 133.
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sentially between each coastal state and its opposite or adjacent
neighbor, and, with respect to seaward limits, between each coastal
state and the international community. Boundaries to delimit spatial
zones are artifically imposed to circumscribe a physical area, and
are, by definition, mutually exclusive and political in character. In
the ocean, spatial limits of state sovereignty are marked by the low-
water line or by baselines defining the extent of internal waters and
the beginning of territorial seas, and by the outer limit and the lat-
eral boundaries of the territorial sea. Boundary functions in the terri-
torial sea can be termed omnifunctional because, subject to the in-
ternational rule of innocent passage, state sovereignty is supreme
within this area. The territorial sea and internal waters are the only
true spatial ocean areas defined by boundaries since they are the
only part of ocean space which is totally dominated, both physically
and politically. One must observe the distinction between zones and
boundaries, as an obvious spatial component to boundaries which de-
limit functional zones exists as well. As these do not define space on
the basis of a claim to absolute sovereignty, however, the criteria for
functional boundary-making must be examined separately. This Ar-
ticle will examine boundaries which delineate the various recognized
spatial and functional ocean zones by looking at the purpose each
serves in the scheme of coastal-state offshore jurisdiction.
Law and State Practice
Baseline for seaward limits
As states began to lay claim to the territorial seas off their coasts,
both the breadth and the point on the coast from which the sea was
to be measured were in doubt and subject to different state practices.
Methods of locating a baseline varied among states and included,
among others, the high or low water mark, the limits of navigable
depths, and the depth to which coastal batteries could be erected. 30
Eventually, state practice settled on a method whereby the low water
line following the sinuousities of the coast deliniated the territorial
sea. This practice was accepted prior to 1951 except where an inden-
tation, such as a bay, called for a straight baseline across its
mouth.3
Norway deviated from this basic formula by traditionally applying
straight baselines to rugged parts of its southern coast. In the 1951
30. H. LAUTERPACHT, OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 443-44 (7th ed. 1948).
31. See C.J. COLOMBOS, supra note 28, at 113.
Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries case,32 the ICJ approved such practice
in certain circumstances. In that case, Norway had legislated a se-
ries of straight baselines along its coast which was heavily indented
and fringed by numerous islands. The lines did not follow the coast
but instead linked points on the mainland promotories or on islands
some distance out to sea. The waters landward of the lines were
claimed as internal waters. The ICJ upheld the validity of these lines
both on historic grounds and also as consistent, under the circum-
stances, with international law.33 By 1951, therefore, it could be ar-
gued that international law had recognized that a territorial sea and
any contiguous zone seaward, if such were claimed, could be mea-
sured either from the low water mark, from acceptable straight base-
lines drawn across the mouth of a bay, or from straight baselines as
drawn in the unique circumstances described in the Anglo-Norwe-
gian Fisheries case.
In 1956 the International Law Commission (ILC) submitted a re-
port to the General Assembly of the United Nations which was to
form the background and framework for the 1958 and 1960 Confer-
ences on the Law of the Sea.34 In it the ILC recommended that the
low water line should be the baseline, except where circumstances
existed as contemplated by the reasoning in the Anglo-Norwegian
Fisheries case. 35 The 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and the
Contiguous Zone (Territorial Sea Convention) 6 did achieve some
certainty with regard to baselines by, in effect, codifying the princi-
ples stated in the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries case-principles which
have not been changed by the LOS Convention. 37
32. Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries, 1951 I.C.J. 116.
33. The judgment found:
(1) if geographically a fringe of islands forms a whole with the mainland, it
may be treated as part of the mainland coast for purposes of delimiting territo-
rial waters;
(2) the governing principle is that the belt of territorial sea must follow the
'general direction of the coast';
(3) the baselines to be drawn in such a case (i) must not 'depart appreciably
from the general direction of the coast'; and (ii) they must be 'sufficiently
closely linked to the land domain to be subject to the regime of internal
waters.'
J. BRIERLY, supra note 23, at 138.
34. UNCLOS I failed to achieve agreement on a number of points-in particu-
lar, the breadth of the territorial sea and the validity of fisheries zones. A second United
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS II) was convened in 1960 to deal
with those gaps, but it did not meet with success.
35. See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
36. See Territorial Sea Convention, supra note 3, arts. 3-13.
37. LOS Convention, supra note 5, art. 7.
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Internal waters
Coastal-state sovereignty over certain enclosed areas of the sea,
such as harbors and bays, has always been accepted. Until the 1958
Geneva Conference, the question of what could constitute a bay was
not settled in international law apart from the question of historic
bays.
38
The issue regarding the status of bays-other than historic
bays-has centered on the permissible length of the line drawn to
enclose the bay. The most practical length accepted was six miles,
because it was twice the generally recognized three-mile width of the
territorial sea. Some states, however, supported a ten-mile baseline,
and others proposed any length as long as the line was drawn from
headland to headland.39 Waters within the line drawn to enclose a
bay are internal waters; the territorial sea is measured from these
lines rather than from the coastline of the bay.
The 1958 Territorial Sea Convention40 established a maximum
width of twenty-four miles for straight baselines enclosing internal
waters other than historic bays. In a legal sense these waters are as
much a part of the territory of a state as is its land area-no right of
innocent passage exists for shipping. The Territorial Sea Convention
also recognized as internal waters those areas within baselines drawn
along a coast heavily indented and fringed with islands.4 In such
waters, unless they met all criteria of the 1951 Anglo-Norwegian
Fisheries case, the right of innocent passage does prevail. 2 These
provisions also have not been altered by the LOS Convention.4 3
Territorial sea
Once states had acknowledged the idea of a territorial sea about
the coast, they had to address themselves to the matter of its
breadth. Territorial sea limits were varied over history and based on
several theories: the line-of-sight doctrine, the cannon-shot rule, and
the marine league doctrine.44 Although earlier writers had consid-
38. The distinction for historic bays was that the state's claim to sovereignty was
based on prescriptive grounds, where it could show evidence of long and consistent do-
minion over the bay which had been accepted by the majority of nations.
39. P. JEssuP, THE LAW OF TERRITORIAL WATERS AND MARITIME JURISDICTION
355-442 (1927).
40. See Territorial Sea Convention, supra note 3, art. 7, para. 5.
41. Id. art. 5, para. 2.
42. Id. art. 5, para. 1.
43. LOS Convention, supra note 5, arts. 7 & 8.
44. See generally S. SWARZTRAUBER, THE THREE MILE LIMIT OF THE TERRITO-
ered the cannon-shot rule, it was Van Bynkershack, a Dutch jurist
who wrote that "the control of the land over the sea extends as far as
a cannon will carry for that is as far as we seem to have both com-
mand and possession. 45 The line-of-sight doctrine-that jurisdiction
extended to all points within sight of the coast-developed during
the same period but never received the wide acceptance accorded the
cannon-shot rule. Both of these theories were factors in the main
reason for claiming territorial seas, namely state security.
The marine league doctrine is attributable to the Danes and
Norwegians who began declaring that their territorial seas was six,
then four, leagues off their coasts for security and protection of their
fishery. In the eighteenth century, conflict over these claims with
Great Britain, France and Sweden finally resulted in a reduction of
the claim to one marine league. By the nineteenth century many
states, including Great Britain, had adopted the marine league as the
breadth of the territorial sea-an area equivalent to three nautical
miles.46
In 1794 the United States became the first country to adopt a
three mile limit in its domestic laws. Admiralty courts of the early
nineteenth century in Great Britain, France, and the United States,
based their decisions on this three-mile limit, which later became
recognized by international treaty.
47
During the nineteenth century, Great Britain, as a primary sea
power, adopted the relatively narrow three-mile limit as consistent
with her freedom of navigation on the high seas. The three-mile limit
was also established in British colonies throughout the world. De-
spite various deviation claims, the three-mile territorial sea generally
was accepted by states until the early 1960s. It was never codified,
although it was recorded by the 1930 Hague Conference as common
state practice.4 8 The ILC suggested a twelve-mile upper limit in its
1956 report but did not specify any specific limit between three and
twelve miles.49 The 1958 Territorial Sea Convention5" failed to es-
tablish a fixed breadth for the territorial sea. The LOS Convention
also does not establish a specific breadth, although it does stipulate a
maximum seaward limit of twelve nautical miles measured from
RIAL SEAS (1972).
45. C. VAN BYNKERSHOEK, DE DOMINO MAR1S 42-43 (2d rev. ed. 1744).
46. See S. SWARZTRAUBER, supra note 44, at 44-50.
47. Id. at 59-61. The treaty between Great Britain and the United States con-
cerned fishing rights on the east coast of Newfoundland and Nova Scotia. See Conven-
tion Respecting Fisheries, Boundary, and the Restoration of Slaves, Oct. 20, 1818, 8
Stat. 248, T.S. No. 112.
48. See C.J. COLOMBOS, supra note 28, at 103-06.
49. A. SHALOWITZ, SHORE AND SEA BOUNDARIES 207-08 (1962).
50. See Territorial Sea Convention, supra note 3, art. 3.
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valid baselines.51
As use of the oceans increased, so too did the need to locate and
define territorial limits spatially between coastal states, and between
individual coastal states and the international community.
Delimitation between nations
Adjacent states are those sharing a common land boundary such
as Canada and the United States. Opposite states are those sepa-
rated by ocean waters such as France and the United Kingdom. As
national claims expanded, the international community saw the need
for an accepted doctrine regarding maritime boundary delimitation,
not only with respect to the seaward limits of different zones, but
between two or more states whose claims overlapped or abutted. Lat-
eral boundaries between states serve to define offshore areas along
political lines and are, therefore, spatial in effect whether the zones
being defined are spatial or functional in nature.
As early as 1949, the ILC was given a mandate to consider ques-
tions relating to the Law of the Sea. In 1953 it commenced a study
of certain draft articles it had prepared relating to the legal regime
of the seas; one study being an inquiry into lateral boundaries be-
tween states in the territorial sea.52 There was little historical prece-
dent in the field. Nevertheless, a committee of experts agreed that
the most satisfactory and equitable method of boundary delimitation
was to draw the boundary between adjacent states using the equidis-
tance method; for opposite states, they recommended using a median
line which embodies the equidistance method. 3 It is of interest to
note that the ILC considered, but rejected as general rules of law,
the following techniques: drawing a line at right angles to the coast
at a point where the land boundary reached the sea; continuing the
land boundary; and drawing a line perpendicular to the general di-
5 1. LOS Convention, supra note 5, art. 3. Evolution of the concept of a territorial
sea has led to international recognition that the area including the seabed and subsoil is
as much under the sovereignty of the coastal state as is the land. The territorial sea
concept was a development of international law; thus, it is limited in its territorial aspect
only by international law principles such as the right of innocent passage for shipping.
With that exception, the law and state practice respecting the territorial sea reflect the
usual characteristics of sovereignty-the coastal state can do anything in the territorial
sea that it can do on land.
52. Consideration of the Commission's draft report covering the work of its eighth
session, [1956] 1 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 288, 381 U.N. Doe A/CN.4/L.68/Add.3.
53. A median line is defined as "a line every point of which is equidistant from
the nearest points on the baseline from which the territorial seas of each of the two states
is measured." See Territorial Sea Convention, supra note 3, art. 12.
rection of the coast.54
The 1958 Conventions did, however, provide guidelines for delimi-
tation of lateral boundaries. The Territorial Sea Convention provided
that the delimitation of boundaries in these zones between opposite
and adjacent states was to be by a median line, except in the territo-
rial sea where historic title or other special circumstances necessi-
tated a variation of this rule.5'
With regard to lateral delimitation of the continental shelf, the
ILC considered the recommendations made regarding the territorial
sea, but indicated an awareness that the greater breadth of the shelf,
using equidistance, could lead to potential inequities since errors
would be magnified. Its first proposals, then, for continental shelf
delimitation were that settlement be by negotiation, or, failing agree-
ment, by compulsory arbitration. Its final proposal was to employ the
same principle for continental shelf delimitation as was employed for
the territorial sea-the equidistance method.5" Eventually, the
formula in article 6 of the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf
(Continental Shelf Convention) for delimiting the boundaries be-
tween opposite states on the same continental shelf stated that de-
limitation should be done by agreement. Failing agreement, article 6
stated that the boundary should be the median line. 57 For adjacent
states on the continental shelf when there is no agreement, the equi-
distance principle is to apply. In all situations, however, the pre-
scribed method of delimitation is subject to the existence of special
circumstances-a term not further defined by the Conventions.
Thus, for marine boundaries between states, the Conventions con-
firmed the state practice of equidistance subject to historic title,
added the new element of "special circumstances," but did not satis-
factorily define the seaward limits.
The new LOS Convention, opened for signature in December
1982, does not provide a clear formula for seaward limits and does
not alter the principles for lateral delimitation. The outer limit is
now measured seaward 200 nautical miles; however, if the shelf is
wider, the outer line can extend up to 350 nautical miles or 100
nautical miles from the 2500-meter isobath.58 It may extend further
54. Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, 11
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 9), U.N. Doe. A/3159 (1956), reprinted in [1956] 2 Y.B. INT'L
L. COMM'N 253, U.N. Doe. A/CN.4/SER.A/1956/Add.1; see also U.S. DEP'T OF
STATE, PUB. No. 7825, 4 DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 294-333 (M. Whiteman ed.
1965) [hereinafter cited as 4 Whiteman].
55. See Territorial Sea Convention, supra note 3, arts. 12 & 24. This Convention
confirmed the state practice of equidistance subject to historic title, while additionally
considering "special circumstances."
56. 4 Whiteman, supra note 54, at 904-06.
57. Continental Shelf Convention, supra note 3, art. 6.
58. LOS Convention, supra note 5, art. 5.
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to submarine elevations which are natural components of the conti-
nental margin.
5 9
With regard to delimitation of the continental shelf between oppo-
site or adjacent coasts, the LOS Convention maintains the primary
thrust of aTticle 6 of the Continental Shelf Convention and the re-
sulting adjudications stating that delimitation "shall be effected by
agreement on the basis of international law . . . in order to achieve
an equitable solution."80 Thus, the LOS Convention maintains the
continuum which is apparent in international maritime boundary de-
limitation through custom, convention, and adjudication.
The matter of delimitation between opposite and adjacent states
has been the subject of international third party adjudication in re-
cent years. In the 1969 North Sea Continental Shelf cases, 1 the ICJ
considered maritime boundary delimitation in a dispute over lateral
boundaries on the continental shelf between the adjacent states of
Germany, Denmark and the Netherlands. The court was asked only
to state the principles by which delimitation was to take place; it was
not asked to prescribe the actual boundary. The court decided that
the equidistance principle was not an emerging rule of customary
international law which had been codified in the Continental Shelf
Convention,6 2 nor had it become so subsequently. Instead, the court
emphasized the Truman Proclamation63 concept of the continental
shelf-that it was a "natural prolongation" of the adjacent land ter-
ritory-and in apportioning claims over the continental shelf, it de-
termined that each state must receive that portion of the shelf which
is the most natural extension of its territory, even if it was closer to
another state.64 The court stated that delimitation should be effected
by "agreement" in accordance with "equitable principles" taking
into account all "relevant circumstances" and leaving as much as
possible to each party all those parts of the continental shelf that
constitute a natural prolongation of its land territory into and under
the sea without encroaching on the natural prolongation of the land
territory of another.
65
59. Id. art. 76.
60. Id. art. 83, para. 1.
61. North Sea Continental Shelf (W. Ger. v. Den.; W. Get. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J.
3 (Judgment of Feb. 20).
62. See Continental Shelf Convention, supra note 3, art. 6.
63. See Proclamation No. 2667, supra note 15, at 68.
64. North Sea Continental Shelf, 1969 I.C.J. at 53, para. 101.
65. Id. at 47. The court added that during such negotiations the following factors
should be considered:
What came out of this case was simply a set of guidelines to be
followed in negotiating offshore boundaries; no substantive rules
were laid down. In essence, delimitation was to be by agreement ac-
cording to equitable principles. The court stated further that when
there is no agreement and the areas claimed overlap, the areas are to
be divided equally or placed under joint jurisdiction.66
The second important delimitation decision arose out of the inabil-
ity of France and the United Kingdom to negotiate their continental
shelf boundaries. The differences between this case and the 1969
case was that England and France, both parties to the Geneva Con-
tinental Shelf Convention, were bound by article 6. Furthermore,
this was an arbitration case in which the parties asked the tribunal
to actually draw the boundary.
The arbitration court rendered its decision in 1977.67 The issue in
the case involved the applicability of the equidistance principle pre-
scribed by article 6 of the Continental Shelf Convention when is-
lands are present within the area. Interpreting article 6, the court
stated that the rule was really a combined "equidistance-special cir-
cumstances" rule, and not an equidistance rule with an onus on one
party to show special circumstances. 8 The court said the purpose of
the rule was to ensure that delimitation would be equitable, rather
than to impose an inflexible application of equidistance. The court
held that the presence of the islands was a special circumstance and
decided the case on a variation of the strict median line by drawing
an "equitable equidistance" line. 9
Two further third-party adjudications were decided at about the
same time, but neither developed nor clarified the principles arising
out of the 1958 Conventions and subsequent boundary cases. In 1976
an interim decision was made by the ICJ in the Aegean Sea Conti-
(i) general configuration of the coast;
(ii) presence of special or unusual features;
(iii) physical structure and natural resources of the shelf area;
(iv) unity of deposits;
(v) a reasonable degree of proportionality of the respective coastlines;
and
(vi) the effect, actual or prospective, of any other delimitation between
adjacent states in the same region.
Id. at 50-54.
66. For an analysis of the judgment, see Grisel, The Lateral Boundaries of the
Continental Shelf and the Judgment of the International Court of Justice in the North
Sea Continental Shelf Cases, 64 AM. J. INT'L L. 562 (1970).
67. Concerning the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf (U.K. v. Fr.), 18 R.
Int'l Arb. Awards 3 (1977).
68. Id. para. 68.
69. For an analysis of the Anglo-French Arbitration Decision, see McRae, Delim-
itation of the Continental Shelf Between the United Kingdom and France: The Channel
Arbitration, 1977 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 173, and Colson, The United Kingdom-France
Continental Shelf Arbitration, 72 AM. J. INT'L L. 95 (1978).
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nental Shelf case70 between Greece and Turkey. However, it did not
provide helpful discussion nor consensus on maritime delimitation
principles. The parties' arguments involved preliminary matters of
interim protection and court jurisdiction. In its decision, the ICJ
concluded that it did not have jurisdiction to resolve the matter. 71 In
1977, an arbitration court rendered an award in the Beagle Channel
case'2 involving the delimitation of the Beagle Channel between
Chile and Argentina. The agreement to go to arbitration provided
that the case was to be decided "in accordance with principles of
international law."1' The case concerned the effect of islands in de-
termining a boundary. Nevertheless, it dealt mainly with the inter-
pretation of an 1881 Treaty of Delimitation, and thus has been char-
acterized as dealing with title to territory rather than location of a
boundary.
74
Recently, the ICJ handed down two more maritime boundary ad-
judications-the Tunisia/Libya Continental Shelf case 5 and the
Gulf of Maine case." In the Tunisia/Libya Continental Shelf case,
the court was asked both to determine the rules and principles of
international law applicable to delimitation of the disputed continen-
tal shelf region, and to take into account not only equitable princi-
ples and relevant circumstances but also the "new accepted trends in
the Third Conference on the Law of the Sea." 77 The parties were to
settle the boundary based on the court's finding as to the applicable
rules and principles to be applied. The court was reluctant to apply
new trends which were not crystallized by customary law; thus, its
decision, taking into account all relevant circumstances, did not sub-
stantially alter the normal rule of delimitation in accordance with
equitable principles. Because the court did not further refine the con-
cept of equitable principles into any strict rule of law, it clearly reaf-
70. Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (Greece v. Turk.), 1976 I.C.J. 3 (Interim Pro-
tection Order of Sept. 11).
71. Id. at 15.
72. Beagle Channel (Chile v. Argen.), Decision of the Court of Arbitration of
Feb. 30, 1977, reprinted in 17 I.L.M. 634 (1978).
73. Agreement for Arbitration Concerning the Region of the Beagle Channel,
July 22, 1971, Argentina-Chile, reprinted in 10 I.L.M. 1182 (1971).
74. See Shaw, The Beagle Channel Arbitration Award, 6 INT'L REL. 415 (1978).
75. Concerning the Continental Shelf (Tunisia v. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya), 1982
I.C.J. 18 (Judgment of Feb. 24), reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 225 (1982) [hereinafter cited as
Tunisia/Libya Continental Shell].
76. Concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine
Area (Can. v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 246 (Judgment of Oct. 12), reprinted in 23 I.L.M. 1197
(1984) [hereinafter cited as Gulf of Maine].
77. Compromise, Libya-Tunisia, Dec. 1, 1978.
firmed the fundamental norm first stated in the 1969 North Sea
Continental Shelf cases.78 It did, however, highlight a number of cir-
cumstances and principles relevant to maritime delimitation.
Most significantly, the court emphasized that in the absence of
agreement between the parties, its duty was to apply equitable prin-
ciples as part of international law, and not to make a decision ex
aequo et bono in order to effect an equitable sharing of the area
resources.79 Economic considerations therefore, were not taken into
account. The court also indicated that it would give considerable
weight to the parties' prior conduct when the conduct demonstrated
that a consensus regarding location of the boundary had existed for a
long period of time. 0 Finally, the court indicated it would give
weight to the maxim "the land dominates the sea" 8' when delimita-
tion corresponds to the general geographic relationship between the
coasts and submerged areas as the basis for the coastal-state
interests.a2
In the most recent decision, involving the Gulf of Maine, the par-
ties asked a special chamber of the ICJ to delimit a single maritime
boundary between their continental shelf and fisheries zones.8 3 The
special chamber applied both the criteria of physical and political
geography and the criteria of proportionality of coastline length, by
attempting to divide the disputed area equally. As the parties re-
quested, the court actually drew the boundary line rather than only
giving an indication of the applicable rules.84 The parties, as agreed,
have accepted this line as binding.85
78. See supra notes 61-66.
79. Tunisia/Libya Continental Shelf, 1982 I.C.J. at 60, para. 71.
80. Id. at 70-71, para. 95.
81. Id. at 61, para. 73 (quoting North Sea Continental Shelf, 1969 I.C.J. at 51,
para. 96).
82. See Tunisia/Libya Continental Shelf, 1982 I.C.J. at 61, para. 74; see also
Feldman, The Tunisia-Libya Continental Shelf Case: Geographic Justice or Judicial
Compromise, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 219 (1983).
83. Article 2 of the Special Agreement Between Canada and the United States
dated March 29, 1979, asked the chamber to decide in accordance with the applicable
principles and rules of international law the following question:
What is the course of the single maritime boundary that divides the continental
shelf and fisheries zones of Canada and the United States of America from a
point in latitude 44 1 1'12" N, longitude 67 16'46" W to a point to be deter-
mined by the Chamber within an area bounded by straight lines connecting the
following sets of geographic coordinates: latitude 40" N, longitude 67" W; lati-
tude 40* N, longitude 65" W; latitude 42 ° N, longitude 65* W?
See Gulf of Maine, 1984 I.C.J. at 253. This was the first case before the court dealing
with the question of a single maritime boundary to divide between nations both a conti-
nental shelf and a water column in a 200 nautical mile economic zone. It was also the
first delimination judgment since the LOS Convention was opened for signature.
84, Id. at 345, para. 243.
85. As in previous cases, the court did not clear up the field of international mari-
time boundary delimitation by defining a substantive rule of law for future disputes. The
designated boundary will add some certainty to the relations between Canada and the
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Functional Zones
The Concept
The recognition of global interdependence based on economic, po-
litical, and environmental needs is a reality which is highlighted with
respect to ocean uses in the 1980s and is the background to recent
developments establishing functional jurisdiction in the marine envi-
ronment. A distinction must be made between functional jurisdiction
and functionalism as a political theory. Functionalism is an approach
to organizing human society which emphasizes the satisfaction of its
common needs and cuts across arbitrary territorial lines of jurisdic-
tion to achieve it. It is a cooperative approach to management which
focuses on needs and purposes rather than on political status. By def-
inition, functionalism views the nation-state doctrine based on terri-
torial sovereignty as inappropriate for the resolution of international
conflicts over global issues and, therefore, inadequate for the fulfill-
ment of individual needs. 86 Both concepts are central to the discus-
sion of functional offshore jurisdiction and the nature of the bounda-
ries which delineate such zones.
Unlike sovereign territorial jurisdiction, functional jurisdiction is
not absolute. Instead, it provides control for a limited purpose or
purposes, and can be unifunctional or multifunctional in nature. The
exclusive element held by the coastal state includes only the activi-
ties and purposes for which the jurisdiction is established and recog-
nized. By contrast, territorial jurisdiction covers all resources and all
activities. In a functional zone, other nations may carry out activities
in the same area which are different from those specific activities for
which the functional jurisdiction is claimed. For example, in a 200-
mile exclusive fishing zone off a coastal state, other nations will have
the high seas right of navigation beyond the territorial waters but
within the fishing zone boundaries. Thus, by definition, zones which
have a functional jurisdiction in the ocean will only exist outside the
territorial limits of a coastal state.
The structure and scope of a functional zone-such as a fisheries
United States; however, the parties still must agree on arrangements which will accom-
modate their mutual and their exclusive interests in managing the important ocean area,
and in managing the resources which are now divided by a judicially drawn line on a
map. See generally Christie, Georges Bank-Common Ground or Continued Battle
Ground?, 23 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 491 1986.
86. See generally E. HAAS, BEYOND THE NATION STATE- FUNCTIONALISM AND
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION (1968); see also FUNCTIONALISM: THEORY AND PRAC-
TICE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (A. Groom & P. Taylor eds. 1975).
zone-is determined by its needs. If the goal is optimum fisheries
management, the zone will ideally be determined by consideration of
the location and movement of different stocks, breeding and spawn-
ing areas. For a pollution control zone, the controlling body will re-
quire authority over all hazardous marine uses in an area where in-
teractions might occur-authority extensive enough to permit
effective offshore control. It is the functional needs based on the de-
mands of the society which, when articulated, should "contain direc-
tions regarding the scope, level, and structure of the organization
needed to address them.
' '87
A functional approach to jurisdiction in the oceans, therefore, will
demand that boundaries drawn to allocate specific jurisdictions take
into account not only location but also scientific and ecological reali-
ties. Boundaries drawn on a functional basis anticipate purposes and
consequences; spatial boundaries, by definition, do not.88
While a state must know the territorial extent of its sovereignty,
nations today are less interested in the ocean for security than they
are for its economic opportunities. Competition between coastal
states is resource-oriented rather than area-oriented. New opportuni-
ties in ocean resource development have promoted the concept of a
functional division of ocean space. How is a functional division dif-
ferent from a spatial division? A functional boundary, although ap-
plied to physical reality encompassing space, is really an abstract or
analytical entity. But a functional zone also has a necessary spatial
element. In moving towards the establishment of a functional ocean
boundary, it is initially necessary to overlook the spatial dimension to
arrive at a "first approximation" 89 of the logical functional zone.
Functional zones are located by the activities sought to be managed;
as the activities involved and the managerial requirements are de-
87. FUNCTIONALISM: THEORY AND PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,
supra note 86, at 16.
88. The management and conservation of fish stocks serves as an example of this
distinction. With few exceptions, the seaward limits of the narrow territorial seas have
not realistically coincided with fishery needs-most fish stocks come and go over the 3 to
12 mile territorial boundary limit, a point at which the coastal state has no jurisdiction to
act in the best interests of the fishery. An expansion of coastal state jurisdiction to 200
miles is geared more to the managerial requirements of fishery zones; therefore, the sea-
ward extension is a functional one. Note, however, that the conservation and manage-
ment rationale for a 200 mile zone is not itself entirely scientifically valid-because
stocks still exist which straddle that limit, the desired functional result may not be ob-
tained. This is so because the selection of the functional zones of jurisdiction in the ocean
is also a political exercise. This underscores the earlier statement-that the theory of
functionalism is linked with the notion of functional jurisdiction-because an interna-
tional arrangement may be required for correlation with activities outside the nationally
designated functional ocean zone in order to achieve optimum management of the ocean
resource involved.
89. Jones, Boundary Concepts in the Setting of Place and Time, 49 ANNALS A.
AM. GEOc. 255 (1959).
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fined and articulated, the spatial definition may, for operational pur-
poses, be established. Clearly, an interdependence exists between the
spatial and functional aspects of the marine environment when carv-
ing out zones in the ocean for long-term management purposes.
Boggs stated that "nature abhors fixed boundary lines" 90 and it is
true that natural and ecological forces fight against the type of for-
mal boundaries Boggs had in mind. Systems such as the ocean have
their own natural boundaries where the spatial extent is determined
by functional activities and oceanographic processes. The spatial and
functional concept of a zone interact in a system such as the ocean;
thus, ocean boundaries must recognize the spatial effect of the natu-
ral system under investigation. These features require a new attitude
toward maritime boundary-making. The ocean areas now recognized
and based on a functional concept are the following: the contiguous
zone, the continental shelf, fishing zones, pollution control zones, and
resource administration zones.91 Emerging as a result of UNCLOS
III is the concept of a multifunctional EEZ.92 Should the treaty
come into force, the "Area,"93 the deep seabed beyond national ju-
risdictions, also will be a functional zone.
As will be seen, ocean boundaries delimiting an area of functional
jurisdiction are not modern concepts. The functional quality of such
boundaries, however, is modified by an operational element based on
the coastal state's desire to acquire territory. In this way, they do not
conform to the theory of functionalism; but they can be properly des-
ignated as functional because they are distinct from strictly political
or spatial boundaries which simply define limits of national territo-
rial sovereignty.
In its pure form, functionalism is a global scheme of political inte-
gration. With regard to ocean boundaries, only the Area as defined
in the LOS Convention would be such a functional zone. In view of
the realities of international politics, such a grand scale of a global
management for ocean uses and resources cannot be truly consid-
ered. Nations, however, can adopt a functional approach to ocean
uses within the limits of their own national jurisdiction, and where
90. Boggs, Delimitation of the Territorial Sea, 24 AM. J. INT'L L. 546 (1930).
The author was Chief Geographer at the United States Department of State and is well
known for his many works on international boundaries on both land and sea. See also S.
BOGGS, INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARIES-A STUDY OF BOUNDARY FUNCTIONS AND
PROBLEMS (1940).
91. See infra text accompanying notes 95, 106, 122, 143 & 174.
92. LOS Convention, supra note 5, arts. 55-75.
93. Id. arts. 136-49.
ocean management needs call for it, on a bilateral or multilateral
regional basis, and consistent with a functionalist approach. The suc-
cess of regional arrangements is a factor in the future process of
boundary delimitation and ocean management. These processes will
have to be worked out under the emerging regime of the Law of the
Sea on a regional and subregional level. Functionalism is an ap-
proach which can consider local, national, regional and global needs.
It is now the basis for establishing resource administration zones and
is a theme which should be integrated with the criteria for establish-
ing offshore boundaries beyond the territorial sea.94 It is also a cen-
tral theme in the theory of ocean management.
Law and State Practice
Contiguous zone
The theory of free ocean use outside the territorial sea became
subject to certain recognized exceptions in a belt of water adjacent
to, and extending seaward from, the territorial sea. Initially during a
time of war, a coastal state would stop and search vessels nearing its
coast. This activity grew into state enforcement of various other spe-
cific functions; thus, a special jurisdiction became accepted. The con-
tiguous zone was the first recognized zone of functional jurisdiction
in the sea. It was invoked "to honor many various, occasional and
particular exercises of authority by coastal states beyond the territo-
rial sea."95
The term contiguous zone was not used until the Hague Conven-
tion of 1930. The concept, however, goes back to the middle of the
eighteenth century when it was introduced by Great Britain which
had passed a series of Hovering Acts between 1736 and 1876.98
These Acts authorized the interception of smugglers and seizure of
contraband on the high seas near the coast but outside the territorial
sea. Great Britain's exercise of this jurisdiction involved various dis-
tances-from two marine leagues to 100 marine leagues depending
on the seriousness of the smuggling problem at the time. The Cus-
toms Consolidation Act of 1876 9 restricted customs jurisdiction to
British vessels within three leagues of the coast. In the meantime,
94. The idea and operation of resource administration zones will be developed
later in this Article. See infra notes 174-200 and accompanying text.
95. M. McDOUGAL & W. BURKE, THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE OCEAN 75 (1962).
The authors further expand on this functional feature of the contiguous zone: "The real
function of the contiguous zone concept has been to serve as a safety valve from the
rigidities of the territorial sea, permitting the satisfaction of particular reasonable de-
mands through exercise of limited authority which does not endanger the whole gamut of
community interests." Id. at 76.
96. See S. SWARZTRAUBER, supra note 44, at 70-71.
97. 39 & 40 Vict., ch. 36.
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however, similar laws extending customs jurisdiction beyond the ter-
ritorial sea were enacted by other countries desiring to follow the
British lead.98
In 1779, the United States followed the British example and pro-
vided for the right to board and search any vessel bound for the
United States and found within twelve miles of the coast.99 In 1922,
Congress broadened the scope of the Tariff Act to apply not just to
customs and revenue but also to breaches of other United States
laws within the zone. 00 It was mutually understood, however, that
where these laws were being imposed outside the territorial sea, the
waters in the zone were still considered high seas under international
law. Consequently, jurisdiction by the United States over vessels
from other nations on the high seas was not countenanced unless it
was acceded to by the other nations. Thus, in the absence of interna-
tional law, convention, or specific treaty, successful enforcement de-
pended on the lack of objection from other states. Regular imposi-
tion of such jurisdiction in a zone beyond the territorial sea
developed without international opposition to such a degree that in
1927, Jessup wrote regarding these zones: "There seems, however, to
be sufficient evidence of acquiescence in reasonable claims to war-
rant the assertion that a customary rule of international law has
grown up under which such acts may be held legal if they meet the
test of reasonableness."''
Because of the continuing uncertainty over the breadth of the ter-
ritorial sea, the contiguous zone was traditionally measured from the
shoreline or baseline. At the 1930 Hague Codification Conference,
the Preparatory Committee recognized that past state practice gen-
erally had adopted a twelve mile contiguous zone.0 2 The ILC also
adopted that twelve mile breadth in its recommendation to the
United Nations in 1956. In 1958 the contiguous zone was codified in
article 24 of the Territorial Sea Convention. 03
98. Spain declared a six mile zone in 1760; France declared a 12-mile zone in
1794; Portugal claimed six miles in 1911; and Norway claimed 10 miles in 1921. See
generally P. JESSUP, supra note 39, at 19-42.
99. See id. at 80.
100. Id. at 213-14.
101. Id. at 95.
102. See C.J. COLOMBOS, supra note 28, at 103-05.
103. See Territorial Sea Convention, supra note 3, art. 24. In a zone of the high
seas contiguous to its territorial sea, the coastal state may exercise the control necessary
to:
(a) Prevent infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary regula-
tions within its territory or territorial seas;
The LOS Convention provides that the contiguous zone has a
maximum breadth of twenty-four nautical miles from the baseline
from which the territorial sea is measured. 04 The contiguous zone,
along with the continental shelf, fisheries conservation, and pollution
zones, are all examples of functional zones in which a coastal state
can exercise a specific authority while not precluding other tradi-
tional uses.
Continental shelf
Claims to the seabed and subsoil off the coast began with the
claim to the territorial sea. By definition, sovereignty had always ap-
plied to the concept of territorial sea. Once approved by the interna-
tional community, the concept of territorialism came to include the
seabed and subsoil. Until this century, the ocean bed beneath the
high seas was considered incapable of occupation by any state. Thus
ocean bed had the same legal status as the high seas. Only in excep-
tional circumstances based on historical claim have limited areas of
the seabed beyond the territorial sea been accepted as capable of
occupation and entitled to recognition. An example is the pearl fish-
eries off the coasts of Ceylon and the Persian Gulf.105 In one in-
stance, an express international agreement was concluded regulating
the use of the seabed beyond territorial jurisdiction, but no question
of sovereignty was involved in this case.10
The subsoil of the seabed beyond territorial seas, however, has
been considered different from the ocean bed. It has been seen as
capable of occupation so long as the use poses no obstruction to navi-
gation. A normal circumstance for instance, would be the case of
mines tunnelled out from shore.'10 It has also been the practice of
many coastal states to claim sedentary fisheries which lie on the sea-
bed itself-justified either on the grounds that such fisheries were
appurtenances of the coastal state or on the the grounds of
prescription. 0 8
Historically, the first formal measure to claim minerals beyond the
territorial sea was the Anglo-Venezuelan Treaty of 1942 relating to
(b) Punish infringement of the above regulations committed within its territory
or territorial seas.
The contiguous zone may not extend beyond 12 miles from the baseline from which the
breadth of the territorial sea is measured.
104. LOS Convention, supra note 5, art. 33.
105. See C.J. COLOMBOS, supra note 28, at 68.
106. Id. In 1923 Britain and France signed an agreement providing for the regula-
tion of oyster fisheries.
107. An example of this is found in the Cornwall Submarine Mines Act, 1858, 21
& 22 Vict., ch. 109. For a review of similar legislation enacted in Canada, see G. LAFOR-
EST, NATURAL RESOURCES AND PUBLIC PROPERTY UNDER THE CANADIAN CONSTITU-
TION 101-04 (1969).
108. G. LAFOREST, supra note 107, at 104.
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the seabed beyond the territorial sea between Trinidad and Vene-
zuela in the Gulf of Paria.10 9 International law doctrine regarding
the continental shelf is also of relatively recent vintage. Though the
term "continental shelf" was geological in its origin, it subsequently
became a legal term. The legal doctrine concerning the continental
shelf which initiated a change in international law was the Truman
Proclamation of 1945.110 The Truman Proclamation was precipitated
by technical developments which made it feasible to drill for hydro-
carbons on the continental shelf beyond territorial limits. Anxious
about its oil reserves, the United States declared that "the Govern-
ment of the United States regards the natural resources of the sub-
soil and seabed of the continental shelf beneath the high seas but
contiguous to the coast of the United States as appertaining to the
United States, subject to its jurisdiction and control."",' While the
proclamation did not define continental shelf, an accompanying press
release indicated that it consisted of the seabed out to one-hundred
fathom depth."' The basic rationale was that the continental shelf
was a natural extension of the land mass. Nonetheless, the United
States claim was not to effect the high seas character of the superja-
cent waters.
The unilateral move by the United States, rather than being sub-
jected to censure by the international community, began a chain re-
action of similar claims around the world. Some nations went even
further and claimed full territorial sovereignty to the edge of the
continental shelf or to 200 miles regardless of the depth of water.113
By the early 1950s, it was generally accepted in international law
that a coastal state had the right to explore and exploit the resources
of the continental shelf. The continental shelf was generally defined
as that part of the ocean floor lying seaward of the territorial seas, as
far as the abyssal depths. Nevertheless, state practice remained va-
ried and confused until UNCLOS 1.114
The Continental Shelf Convention'1 5 provided a legal/geological
definition of the nature and extent of the shelf, the features of the
coastal-state jurisdiction, and guidelines for lateral boundary delimi-
109. Treaty Relating to the Submarine Areas of the Gulf of Paria, Feb. 26, 1942,
United Kingdom-Venzuela, 205 L.N.T.S. 122.
110. See Proclamation No. 2667, supra note 15, at 67-68.
111. Id.
112. 13 DEP'T ST. BULL. 484 (1945).
113. See C.J. COLOMBOS, supra note 28, at 70-82.
114. See supra note 3.
115. See Continental Shelf Convention, supra note 3, art. 1.
tation between states. The seaward extent of the continental shelf,
however, remains unclear in both a scientific and legal sense. Article
1 describes the continental shelf as referring
to the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas adjacent to the coast but
outside the area of the territorial sea, to a depth of 200 metres or, beyond
that limit, to where the depth of the superjacent waters admits of the ex-
ploitation of the natural resources of the said areas . .. . 1
Sovereign rights are granted exclusively to the coastal state for the
purpose of exploring and exploiting natural resources,117 subject to
the right of other states to lay submarine cables or pipelines. 18 Be-
cause there is no interference with navigation or fishing, the superja-
cent waters retain their status as high seas." 9 The Continental Shelf
Convention also codifies the traditional right to tunnel from the land,
under the subsoil.' 20
The functional feature of the continental shelf as an ocean zone is
its exploitability, which serves the purpose of bringing valuable min-
eral resources under coastal-state control. Yet it does not give a
coastal state exclusive or absolute authority for all purposes and does
not in itself effect the high seas character of the surface and water
column above.
Fishing zone
Initially, claims by coastal states to exclusive fishing zones were
linked to the measurement of the territorial sea, as nations claimed
an extension of their sovereignty in order to protect and secure the
fisheries to themselves. These claims were initiated by the Scandina-
vian countries where fishing was the primary reason for both the ter-
ritorial sea and the contiguous zone claims. 21 These claims, al-
though for the purpose of fishery protection, were initially territorial
in nature. Thus, one reason the three-mile limit for the territorial sea
failed is because that width was illogical for fishery management and
conservation.
The nonterritorial claim to fishery zones was first contemplated by
the Proclamation with Respect to Coastal Fisheries in Certain Areas
of the High Seas, 22 which accompanied the Truman Proclamation
116. Id.
117. Id. art. 2.
118. Id. art. 4.
119. Id. art. 3.
120. Id. art. 7.
121. See S. SWARZTRAUBER, supra note 44, at 44-66. In 1958 Denmark reserved
to its subjects a fisheries zone two leagues off the coast; in 1636 Norway reserved a four
to six league zone; and in 1935 Norway delineated its territorial sea by straight baselines
measuring four miles in breadth.
122. Proclamation No. 2668, 3 C.F.R. 68 (1945), reprinted in 59 Stat. 885 (1945),
and in 1 S. ODA, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE OCEAN DEVELOPMENT: BASIc Docu-
MENTS 342 (1972).
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on the Continental Shelf. The United States took the position that it
was proper to declare fishing zones in certain areas outside the terri-
torial sea, and it conceded the right of other nations to do so. The
United States" government explained that it was not claiming exclu-
sive fishery rights but was making possible certain conservation
measures.1
23
Between 1947 and 1955, five Latin American countries went be-
yond the scope of the Truman Proclamation with regard to fisheries
and declared a 200-mile limit for exclusive fishing rights. These
countries justified their claim on the basis of science. They argued
that the complex ecological system averaging 200 miles in width off
their coast should be considered one fishery both for purposes of con-
servation and in compensation for having a narrow continental
shelf.124 In 1952, Chile, Ecuador and Peru signed agreements creat-
ing zones of fisheries jurisdiction. They reserved a twelve-mile exclu-
sive zone for their nationals and a 200-mile multilateral fisheries
zone in which all three countries claimed jurisdiction. 125 There was
strong opposition, especially from the United States, to their claim
and the theory on which it was based. As a result, the period from
1952 to 1969 saw many confrontations. 126
The Latin American countries were not the only nations to claim
exclusive fisheries rights on the high seas. Many developing nations
made such claims after World War II in an effort to protect their
fishing grounds from the fleets of the industrialized nations. Conflict
over fisheries jurisdiction was taking place off the coasts of the Euro-
pean countries as well, as the Grotian doctrine of inexhaustible
ocean resources was being recognized as unsound. 127
The problem of conservation on the high seas was considered in
1955 at the International Technical Conference for the Conservation
of Living Resources of the High Seas held in Rome.128 Until that
time, conservation measures had been achieved in certain areas by
multilateral fishery conventions. Although, the Rome Conference
concluded that multilateral fishery conventions were still the best ap-
123. 4 Whiteman, supra note 54, at 959-62.
124. D. O'CONNELL, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 553-58 (1982).
125. See S. SWARZTRAUBER, supra note 44, at 182-83.
126. For a description of this period, see D. JOHNSTON, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW
OF FISHERIES 333-41 (1965).
127. See, e.g., Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries, 1951 I.C.J. 116.
128. Report of the International Technical Conference on the Conservation of the
Living Resources of the Sea, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.10/6 (1955).
proach, it drew international attention to the problem. 129
The first attempt to codify principles of conservation and manage-
ment of the living resource outside the territorial sea occurred at the
1958 Gene a Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living
Resources of the High Seas (Fishing and Conservation Conven-
tion). 130 The Convention provided for freedom of fishery on the high
seas subject to treaty obligations and the rights of coastal states, and
failing agreement, the right to adopt nondiscriminatory, unilateral
measures for conservation. Following the lead of the 1958 Conven-
tion, Iceland declared a twelve-mile fishing limit which was func-
tional, not territorial. 13' Following resolutions made at the 1960
Convention, Norway and Denmark also adopted twelve-mile fishery
zones. 132 In 1966 the United States enacted legislation establishing
an exclusive fishing zone of twelve miles 33 -the breadth of these
zones being measured from the baselines for the territorial sea. 34
In 1964 Canada established a fishery zone of twelve miles under
the Territorial Sea iand Fishing Zones Act.135 The Act also provided
for the legislating of straight baselines. In 1970 the Act was
amended to extend the territorial sea to twelve miles and provide for
fishery zones on both the east and west coasts." 6
By the late 1960s, the concept of jurisdictional zones for conserva-
tion and management of fisheries contiguous to the territorial sea
had become an accepted practice in international law. In 1968 of the
fifty-nine nations with claims to fishery zones extending beyond terri-
torial limits, thirty-seven settled on a twelve-mile zone.13 7 The trend,
however, had already commenced for even wider fishery zones. By
the same year, eight Latin American states had claimed a 200-mile
limit for fisheries jurisdiction. 38
When UNCLOS III began in 1974, the concept of a 200-mile
zone for fishery jurisdiction was becoming acceptable to most par-
ticipants. Canada declared a 200-mile exclusive fishery zone on Jan-
uary 1, 1977,139 and the United States enacted legislation for such a
129. 4 Whiteman, supra note 54, at 967.
130. See Fishing and Conservation Convention, supra note 3.
131. 4 Whiteman, supra note 54, at 34.
132. Id. at 34.
133. Act of Oct. 14, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-658, 80 Stat. 908.
134. Id.
135. Ch. 22, 1964-1965 Can. Stat.
136. Ch. 68, 1969-1970 Can. Stat.
137. D. Johnston & E. Gold, Extended Jurisdiction: The Impact of UNCLOS III
on Coastal State Practice 20 (Oct. 15, 1979) (unpublished manuscript available from the
Dalhousie Ocean Studies Programme, Dalhousie University, Halifax, Canada).
138. These countries were Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador,
Nicaragua, Panama, and Peru.
139. CAN. CONSOL, REGS. chs. 1547-1549 (1978).
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zone which became effective on March 1, 1977.14° Today, although
there are variations in the degree of exclusivity claimed, the 200-
mile zone for fisheries has become widely accepted as state
practice.1 41
Pollution Control Zone
Marine pollution has several sources: runoff or atmosphere pollu-
tion; ship-generated pollution from discharge and accidents; dump-
ing or disposal of wastes at sea; and exploration and exploitation of
the sea from offshore oil drilling. The causes of marine pollution
have been categorized as accidental, operational or planned waste
disposal. 42 The process of change within the international commu-
nity which leads to unilateral state action to control marine pollution
is important. This change encompasses a series of multilateral con-
ventions spurred on by several major maritime shipping disas-
ters-the sinking of oil tankers Torrey Canyon in 1967, the Argo
Merchant in 1976, and the Amoco Cadiz in 1978.111
The first formal international action taken was at the 1954 Inter-
national Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Seas by
Oil.144 It prohibited ships from discharging oil in certain areas of the
sea, usually within fifty miles of a coast. It did not provide, however,
for any external enforcement by a coastal state because of treaty
provisions giving exclusive control over the ship to the flag state. The
only available protection for a coastal state was deemed to be action
in self-defense. The Law of the Sea, as reflected in the existing con-
ventions, left control over shipping in the flag state. The coastal state
could not act in a managerial capacity to prevent pollution, and
could only act in self-defense after a disaster.
The 1958 Convention on the High Seas (High Seas Convention) 145
contemplated state action to prevent pollution but did not specify a
jurisdictional zone for such purpose. Article 24 simply provided that
every state should draw up regulations to prevent oil pollution of the
140. Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-265, 90
Stat. 331.
141. As of 1979, 79 states had made claims to a 200-mile zone covering jurisdic-
tion over fisheries. See D. Johnston & E. Gold, supra note 137, at 29.
142. For a useful treatise on marine pollution, see G. TIMAGENIS, INTERNATIONAL
CONTROL OF MARINE POLLUTION (1980).
143. See, e.g., Dubais, Some Legal Aspects of the Amoco Cadiz Incident, 1979
LLOYDS MAR. & CoM. L.Q. 292.
144. Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Seas by Oil, opened for
signature May 12, 1954, 12 U.S.T. 2989, T.I.A.S. No. 4900, 327 U.N.T.S. 3.
145. See High Seas Convention, supra note 3.
sea from ships, pipelines, exploration and exploitation, and prevent
pollution from radioactive waste.
146
Between 1958 and the 1972 Stockholm Conference on the Human
Environment, several other global conventions were adopted.
147
These conventions dealt only with the question of liability for oil pol-
lution from shipping and did not establish a jurisdictional regime for
coastal states. Also, a number of treaties were adopted involving ra-
dioactive pollution, but they did not necessarily have an environmen-
tal focus.'4" In 1972 the United Nations Conference on the Human
Environment was held which greatly influenced marine antipollution
activities over the next few years.14 9 From 1972 until the present,
global treaties have become more comprehensive with enlarged
objectives and concerns for pollutants other than oil.'50 A number of
regional agreements have also been signed since the Stockholm
conference. 151
The first offshore zone declared specifically for controlling pollu-
tion was set forth in the Canadian Arctic Waters Pollution Preven-
tion Act 52 which prohibited the deposit of waste into Arctic waters.
The zone was 100 nautical miles in width measured from the Arctic
coast. The purpose of the Act was clarified by the Secretary of State
for External Affairs: "The Arctic Wastes Bill represents a construc-
tive and functional approach to environmental preservation. It as-
serts only the limited jurisdiction required to achieve a special and
vital purpose. It separated a limited pollution control jurisdiction
from the total bundle of jurisdictions which together constitute
sovereignty.'1
53
In an exchange of diplomatic notes with the United States, Can-
ada justified the move under international law by stating that a
146. Id. art. 24. Regulations were to be made only pursuant to existing interna-
tional treaties.
147. See G. TIMAGENIS, supra note 142, at 4-9 (listing antipollution regulations).
148. Id. at 7-8.
149. The Conference produced a declaration of principles for the preservation and
enhancement of the human environment. It also produced an action plan with over 100
recommendations for international environmental planning. See Declaration of the
United Nations Conference on the Human Environment and Action Plan for the Human
Environment, adopted June 16, 1972, Report of the United Nations Conference on the
Human Environment, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14 (1972), reprinted in 11 I.L.M. 1416
(1972).
150. See G. TIMAGENIS, supra note 142, at 9-12 (listing antipollution activities).
151. For an excellent review of regional developments in the protection and conser-
vation of the marine environment, see Johnston & Enomoto, Regional Approaches to the
Protection and Conservation of the Marine Environment, in THE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
OF THE SEA 285 (D.M. Johnston ed. 1981). This volume, published by IUCN, represents
a tremendous effort on the part of knowledgeable contributors and is an excellent refer-
ence to both the pre-Stockholm and post-Stockholm developments in the international
community.
152. CAN. REV. STAT. 1st Supp. ch. 2 (1970).
153. PARL. DEB. H.C. (5th Ser.) (April 16, 1970).
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threat to a state's environment constituted a threat to its security.
The Act, therefore, was a lawful extension of a limited jurisdiction
to meet a particular danger.154 Amendments to the Territorial Sea
and Fishing Zones Act155 also established fisheries closing lines, and
further amendments to the Canada Shipping Act'" in 1971 ex-
tended to those zones jurisdiction for controlling marine pollution.
The Ocean Dumping Control Act,157 allowing jurisdiction over
dumping at sea, also applied to the fishing zone within the closing
lines. These provisions now pertain to the existing 200-mile fishing
zone.
Another unilateral claim to a maritime pollution control zone was
made by the United States in the Clean Water Act of 1977,158 where
jurisdiction to prohibit vessel discharge was extended not only to the
territorial sea and contiguous zone, but also to activities on the conti-
nental shelf and within the 200 mile fishery management zone estab-
lished in 1977.159
Prior to these enactments, the pollution control legislation by
coastal states related only to areas within the territorial sea although
a coastal state's right to intervene when an incident occurred within
its territorial jurisdiction was unquestioned. The Canadian Arctic
Waters legislation, in particular, is significant because it creates a
functional enforcement zone beyond national territorial jurisdiction
for the specific purpose of controlling marine pollution. The "Arctic
exception clause" contained in article 234 of the LOS Convention
would appear to legitimize the Canadian initiative in international
law and support this trend in state practice.16 0 When the LOS Con-
vention comes into force, the EEZ will be the coastal-state functional
zone for pollution control. Regulation of ship-generated pollution,
however, will still not be absolute in the coastal state outside of the
territorial sea.1 61
154. The notes are reprinted in J. SCHNEIDER, WORLD PUBLIC ORDER OF THE EN-
VIRONMENT 85 (1979).
155. Ch. 68, 1969-1970 Can. Stat., amended by CAN. REV. STAT. 1st Supp. ch. 45
(1970).
156. CAN. REV. STAT. ch. S-9 (1970), amended by ch. 27, 1970-1972 Can. Stat.
543.
157. Ocean Dumping Control Act, ch. 55, 1974-1976 Can. Stat. 1195.
158. Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566.
159. Id. § 59, 91 Stat. at 1593-96.
160. LOS Convention, supra note 5, art. 234.
161. Id. art. 211.
LOS Convention Provisions: The EEZ and the Area
The nature and extent of many of the 200-mile claims now ex-
isting in state practice is uncertain. For example, of the seventy-nine
claims to 200-mile jurisdiction which existed in 1979, twenty-three
were designated as unifunctional fishing zones, forty-two were desig-
nated as multifunctional exclusive economic zones, and fourteen
were claimed as territorial seas. 62 The new LOS Convention reflects
the trend to national functional jurisdiction and, if it comes into
force, will provide some uniformity to the extended jurisdiction
claims.
The functional zone created by the LOS Convention which will
have immediate and practical ramifications is the EEZ. 6 3 The EEZ
is to extend 200 nautical miles from shore, within which the coastal
state will have jurisdiction for various purposes over the seabed, sub-
soil and superjacent waters.'6 4 Other states will continue to enjoy the
traditional rights of freedom of navigation and overflight, and the
laying of submarine cables and pipelines. Also, land-locked and oth-
erwise geographically disadvantaged states will have the right to
share in the exploitation of surpluses of the living resources of the
zone.
The debate over the nature of the superjacent waters of the EEZ
has focused on whether the waters are high seas in which the states
have residual rights, or whether the zone is'sui generis so that rights
of other states must be spelled out. The consensus has generally been
that the EEZ is sui generis in spite of its high seas features.'65
The functional nature of the zone becomes clear when its hybrid
aspects are considered. It is territorial in nature because rights are
contingent on propinquity of the coastal state. But it is functional in
nature because the coastal state not only has an opportunity to man-
age more activities in a wider, functional zone, but also has a respon-
sibility to manage properly and share the surplus of living resources.
In addition, it is functional in extent because it is a multipurpose
zone which goes beyond territorial jurisdiction in order to achieve
162. Hodgson & Smith, Boundary Issues Created by Extended National Jurisdic-
tion, 69 GEOGRAPHICAL REV. 426 (1979).
163. LOS Convention, supra note 5, arts. 55-75.
164. Id. arts. 56-57. The coastal state will have jurisdiction for:
(a) exploring and exploiting, and conserving and managing both living and
nonliving natural resources;
(b) otherwise exploring and exploiting the economic potential of the zone such
as for energy production from water, currents and wind;
(c) establishing and using artificial islands, installations and structures;
(d) marine scientific research;
(e) protection and preservation of the marine environment.
165. For an in depth discussion of features of the EEZ, see W. EXTRAVOUR, THE
EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE (1978).
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the specific but limited purposes for which it is established.
A feature of the multifunctional EEZ, which differs from the ear-
lier and existing unifunctional zones, is that it establishes not only
the rights of the coastal state, but also those of the international
community in the zone.1 6 This feature brings the nature of the EEZ
closer to the classical definition of functionalism than any previous
maritime zone. The emerging regime in its positive sense is a com-
promise with the realities of ocean development as we approach the
twenty-first century, for it now provides the opportunity for coastal
states to actually manage ocean uses on a systematic basis. The LOS
Convention provides the same guidelines for lateral delimitation of
the EEZ between opposite or adjacent states as for the continental
shelf: "By agreement on the basis of international law . . . in order
to achieve an equitable solution. 18 7
The Area is a new creation of UNCLOS III. It consists of the
deep seabed and subsoil beyond the limits of national jurisdiction,
continental shelf and the EEZ. The establishment of an international
authority has been proposed to manage the exploitation of resources
in the Area for the benefit of the world community. This deep sea-
bed regime would be the only functional zone under a global juris-
diction, and, in that sense, the only functional zone presently con-
templated which would not contain an element of territoriality. 168
UNCLOS III also passed a resolution to establish a Preparatory
Commission1 69 to expedite the formation of the International Sea-
Bed Authority170 and the International Tribunal for the Law of the
Sea17 ' as mechanisms for management of the Area and for the reso-
lution of disputes.
Resource Administration Zone
Boundaries in the ocean which delimit the territorial sovereignty
of coastal states often do not coincide with the location of marine
166. LOS Convention, supra note 5, art. 58. The expression ex aequo et bono
means to make a decision on the justice of the case even though it conflicts with legal
norms. To confer such mandate on the tribunal requires agreement by both parties, and,
in effect, would allow the tribunal to abrogate or modify existing rights. Typically, this
arrangement exists when no third party interests are at stake.
167. Id. art. 74.
168. Id. arts. 136-49.
169. LOS Convention, supra note 5, Annex 1, Establishment of the Preparatory
Commission for the International Sea-Bed Authority and for the International Tribunal
for the Law of the Sea.
170. LOS Convention, supra note 5, arts. 156-85.
171. Id. arts. 186-91.
resources. The issue does not arise with regard to solid mineral re-
sources which straddle an international boundary. They can be ap-
portioned according to the boundary line and removed without the
requirement for joint planning and agreement. With regard to fish
stocks and petroleum deposits, however, their respective migratory
and fluid natures raise a unique problem. Fish stocks may move back
and forth over the boundary while the fluid nature of a petroleum
deposit permits its removal from any direction without regard to a
fixed boundary location. Other common activities in a boundary re-
gion, such as marine transportation and offshore and coastal activi-
ties leading to marine pollution, raise the same issues. Nonetheless,
offshore resource utilization clearly highlights the essential problem
in locating ocean boundaries. As one commentator has stated: "The
latter [boundary disputes] centers on areas of dispute concerning the
location of the boundary, whereas the former [resource utilization] is
concerned with a common resource whose mobility often remains un-
affected by the boundary itself, but whose utilization by the states
concerned is strictly determined by the boundary.'
17 2
Resource administration zones are established to provide a specific
functional jurisdiction over a specific problem. Working examples of
these exist throughout various regions of the world ocean although
they do not yet have a defined status in international law and are
normally binational or regional in character. Such zones, unless en-
tirely within one nation's jurisdiction, cann6t be claimed unilaterally.
Rather, they require a functional, cooperative relationship between
the parties involved. This type of zone can be useful at the regional
or binational level, and, in the case of a federal state, at the national
or internal level as well. The boundaries defining such a zone are
established not to coincide with territorial, political, or sovereign
boundary limits. Rather, they are established in spite of, or in ab-
sence of, such defined limits. They are established on the basis of the
nature and location of a particular resource, so that the resource
may be developed and administered for the benefit of the parties in-
volved-bypassing the problems of territorial boundary settlements
or permitting an equitable division of the transboundary resource by
agreement. Internationally, the use of resource administration
boundaries are important when dealing with mobile resources, such
as fish stocks, or with fluid resources, such as an oil or gas deposit
underlying two or more state jurisdictions. Nationally, they generally
have been used to expedite development of offshore resources where,
due to the historical and constitutional background, the proprietary
rights of the resources between the central and individual units of a
172. Minghi, Boundary Studies in Political Geography, 53 ANNALS A. Am. GEOG.
140-60 (1963) (author's brackets).
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federal state are unclear. 
1 7
Usually, where ownership of natural resources is involved, states
find it difficult to resolve boundary disputes, thereby delaying ex-
ploitation of the resources and delaying effective management and
conservation measures. One way for neighboring coastal states to
proceed with resource utilization, whether or not the boundary is set-
tled, is to arrange a division or a joint development effort which will
not effect subsequent territorial settlements. The concept was first
used in international fisheries management, and has been employed
more recently to achieve joint development of offshore transboundary
petroleum deposits.
High seas fisheries management
While the 200-mile exclusive fishing zones described above are re-
ally functional zones of national jurisdiction, the setting of bounda-
ries or creation of zones to delimit certain bilateral or multilateral
regional fishing activities has been done for years at the international
level. Fisheries conventions became popular when national limits of
jurisdiction were narrow and coastal states did not possess the same
exclusive or preferential rights regarding off-shore fishing as they
now have. High seas fisheries were regulated by treaty among inter-
ested states without violating the principle of the freedom of the
seas.
An early arrangement regulating a high seas fishery between Can-
ada and the United States occurred under the Pacific Halibut
Treaty.1 7 4 This Treaty provided for the appointment of an Interna-
tional Pacific Halibut Commission which was to investigate and rec-
ommend certain regulations within the resource administration area
known as "convention waters." These were defined by article 1(2) as
"territorial waters and high seas off the western coasts of Canada
and the United States of America, including southern as well as
173. The province of Nova Scotia negotiated an agreement with the Canadian gov-
ernment in 1982 for management and revenue sharing of offshore oil and gas develop-
ment. For details of this agreement see Doucet, Canada-Nova Scotia Offshore Agree-
ment: One Year Later, 22 ALTA. L. REV. 132 (1984). More recently, an agreement on
resource management and revenue sharing also was negotiated with Newfoundland, fol-
lowing litigation in the Supreme Court of Canada between the province of Newfound-
land and the Canadian government over continental shelf jurisdiction resulting in a judg-
ment favoring the federal authority. See Reference Regarding the Seabed and Subsoil of
the Continental Shelf Offshore Newfoundland, 5 D.L.R. 385 (4th ed. 1984).
174. Treaty on Preservation of North Pacific Halibut Fishery, Mar. 2, 1953,
United States-Canada, 5 U.S.T. 5, T.I.A.S. No. 2900.
western coasts of Alaska." 175 The Commission was empowered to di-
vide the convention waters into areas, to limit the catch from such
areas, and to determine the nature of equipment to be used. 176 This,
then, was an example of a very roughly designated resource adminis-
tration zone. It did not involve any claims to sovereignty; it simply
was an agreement among the users of a resource to administer that
resource within a particular ocean area including both the high seas
and territorial waters of the participating states. Thus, it was a func-
tional division of ocean space on a regional basis.
Canada entered into another bilateral fisheries convention with the
United States through the Sockeye Salmon Fisheries Convention.
1 77
The Convention created the International Pacific Salmon Commis-
sion which was given authority to limit or prohibit the taking of
sockeye salmon in any waters designated in the Convention. These
waters were defined in very specific geographical terms by article I
and became a functional resource administration zone for the stated
purposes. 17 On January 28, 1985, a new Canada/United States Pa-
cific Salmon Treaty 7 9 was signed, effectively terminating the former
treaty. The new bilateral agreement provides for salmon manage-
ment in waters of the Northwest United States, British Columbia,
and Southeast Alaska.180 The treaty establishes a new Pacific
Salmon Commission and three advisory panels, one each for the Fra-
ser River Area, the Southern coastal area, and the Northern coastal
area. The Southern and Northern Panels have responsibility in their
respective areas over certain coastal rivers where salmon originate.
The Fraser Panel has responsibility for salmon management in a ge-
ographically defined area of territorial seas and high seas off the
coasts of Canada and the United States.' 8 '
Canada also became party to a multilateral convention with the
United States and Japan under the Northern Pacific Fisheries Con-
vention.18 2 This Convention introduced the abstention principle: if
the fishery had been subject to an extensive conservation program by
one or more of the other parties, then any of the contracting parties
could be requested to abstain from participating in the fishery in the
designated area. In this instance, the zone or convention area was
defined as "all waters other than territorial waters of the North Pa-
175. Id. art. 1, para. 2.
176. Id. art. 3, para. 2.
177. Convention on the Fraser River System Sockeye Fisheries, May 30, 1930,
United States-Canada, 50 Stat. 1355, T.S. No. 918.
178. Id. art. 1.
179. Treaty Concerning Pacific Salmon, Jan. 28, 1985, United States-Canada.
180. Id.
181. Id., Annex 2, art. 1.
182. Northern Pacific Fisheries Convention, May 9, 1952, 4 U.S.T. 380, T.I.A.S.
No. 3786.
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cific Ocean which for the purposes hereby shall include the adjacent
seas."
183
In 1950 the International Convention for the Northwest Atlantic
Fisheries (ICNAF)18 4 came into effect between Canada, the United
States, and nine other nations with an historic interest in fishing the
waters of the northwest Atlantic Ocean. 185 This agreement pioneered
a technique whereby the convention area was divided along lines of
latitude and longitude into five sub-areas. These sub-areas were fre-
quented by more or less distinct stocks of demersal fish and each
sub-area was to be studied by a panel made up of the nations ex-
ploiting it. The panel then proposed regulatory measures for review
by the commission created by the treaty. If accepted by the commis-
sion and the member governments of the panel, the regulations be-
came binding on the contracting governments whose nationals fished
the area. The commission also specified closed areas and seasons for
certain species. The area to which the Convention applied was called
the "convention area" and was specifically defined by lines of lati-
tude and longitude. The Convention applied to the area outside the
territorial waters beginning at a point on the Rhode Island coast,
then south and east into the Atlantic, and north between Labrador,
Baffin Island, and Greenland. 186 As a result of the extensions by
Canada and the United States in 1977 of their fishing zones to 200
miles, ICNAF was renegotiated and the Northwest Atlantic Fisher-
ies Organization (NAFO) established.
The Canadian use of functional zones for international fisheries
management is an example of international fishery agreements
which effectively define areas of the ocean along functional lines for
purely administrative purposes relating to fisheries management,
when specified regulatory and conservation provisions are applied.
Transboundary Petroleum Development
Joint resource administration boundaries also have been used in
cases of a single petroleum structure or field, whether onshore or
offshore, which underlies the territory of two or more states.187 Con-
183. Id. art. 1.
184. Convention for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries, Feb. 8, 1949, 1 U.S.T. 477,
T.I.A.S. No. 2089, 157 U.N.T.S. (entered into force by the United States on July 3,
1950).
185. The number of signatories later increased to 16.
186. 1979 Can. T.S. No. 11.
187. See Onorato, Apportionment of an International Common Petroleum De-
posit, 17 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 85 (1968); Valencia, Taming Troubled Waters: Joint De-
tinental shelf technology and extended coastal-state jurisdiction have
made this potential source of international dispute a very real prob-
lem in some parts of the world ocean. Because of petroleum's fluid
nature, the deposit may be tapped from anywhere on its perimeter,
raising the possibility of one party depleting the reserve or, at least,
the possibility of an inequitable allocation between parties.
In the 1950 Report of the ILC, the Rapporteur stated that the
primary concern in the case of a potential common petroleum de-
posit should be the preservation of the unity of the deposit.1 8" In
1954 an internationally recognized commentator indicated the dan-
ger in dividing an oil pool among different countries. "Two conces-
sionaries should not tap the same pool, or in a descriptive parable,
never two straws in one glass." 189
The Continental Shelf Convention19 ° did not cover this type of sit-
uation with respect to boundary delimitation, although some consider
it a "special circumstance" under article 6 allowing deviation from
the prescribed equidistance line in the absence of an agreement. 91
This matter was considered in the North Sea Continental Shelf
cases:
[I]t frequently occurs that the same deposit lies on both sides of the line
dividing a continental shelf between two states, and since it is possible to
exploit such a deposit from either side, a problem immediately arises on
account of the risk of prejudicial or wasteful exploitation by one or other of
the States concerned.
19 2
In further referring to unity of deposits, the ICJ conceded that read-
ily ascertainable natural resources could be one factor taken into ac-
count by the parties to achieve an equitable solution. 193 The ICJ also
noted that if preserving the unity of the deposit is a matter of con-
cern, the parties themselves must provide for this by a voluntary
agreement.1
9 4
Exploitation of petroleum is one area from which to draw a wealth
of precedent in the domestic petroleum laws of various countries.
Most states now provide for cooperative or unitized exploitation of
velopment of Oil and Mineral Resources In Overlapping Claim Areas, 23 SAN DIEGO L.
REv. 661 (1986).
188. Summary Records of the 66th Meeting, [1950] 1 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 207-
12, U.N. Doc.A/CN.4/Ser.A/1950.
189. Mouton, The Continental Shelf, in RECUEIL DEs COURs 421 (1954).
190. See Continental Shelf Convention, supra note 3.
191. Id. art. 6.
192. North Sea Continental Shelf, 1969 I.C.J. at 51, para. 97.
193. Id. at 51, para. 97.
194. Id. Presently, international law sets no constraints on parties engaged in a
boundary dispute from dealing with a common resource situation by agreement. Of
course, agreement must be the basis for such arrangement: it must be by joint and coop-
erative action that resource administration boundaries are established and effectively
employed.
648
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shared or common petroleum deposits;195 the old common-law "rule
of capture," or "prior expropriation," is no longer the applicable
principle. In dealing with common petroleum deposits offshore, inter-
national state practice has borrowed from the private law practice of
cooperative management. Arrangements have also been made to
agree on resource sharing in the context of continental shelf delimi-
tation and general maritime boundary agreements.
One international scholar, in a thorough examination of trans-
boundary petroleum deposits, has suggested that state practice re-
flects four types of cooperative agreements. 196 When the political
boundary has been settled prior to an offshore resource administra-
tion agreement, the basis for agreement amounts to a sharing
formula-the geographical distribution of the resource being a sig-
nificant factor in developing the formula. When, however, a bound-
ary issue has not been resolved and claims to the resource overlap,
the basis for agreement will likely be an equal division of benefits
and costs.
Resource administration agreements have been included in ap-
proximately thirty-eight international agreements between coastal
states, most of which are bilateral.1 97 While several of these agree-
195. Unitization is defined as
The bringing together by some legal method of separately owned interests in oil
and gas ... so that an overall program of development and production opera-
tions may be carried on in this area on behalf of, and for the benefit of the
owners of such interests by single or co-ordinated management.
Kelly, Unitization in the Oil and Gas Industry, 4 CAN. B.J. 81 (1961).
196. Lagoni, Oil and Gas Deposits Across National Frontiers, 73 AM. J. INT'L L.
215, 222-29 (1979). The four types of cooperative agreements include:
(i) geological cooperation, where each party works a share proportionate to
the amount of reserves in its territory at the time the agreement is concluded,
all in accordance with the calculations of a joint commission. This assumes a
settled, or interim boundary arrangement prior to the resource agreement.
(ii) joint operations, where, in the absence of a boundary settlement, the par-
ties agree on a preliminary boundary and apply their own jurisdictions on their
side. Each party is entitled to an equal share which is arrived at by contractual
arrangement between concessionaries on both sides.
(iii) unitized exploitation, where, similar to many domestic arrangements, a
single operator manages the deposit on behalf of all parties in a joint develop-
ment zone in which concesessionaries from both sides enter into operating
agreements and benefits and expenses are regularly shared. This arrangement
can be utilized with or without a settled boundary.
(iv) condominium arrangement, where the parties establish a common zone
on the seabed wherein each maintains equal sovereign rights over the whole
zone and a joint commission oversees development.
197. T. McDORMAN, K. BEAUCHAMP & D. JOHNSTON, MARITIME BOUNDARY DE-
LIMITATION: AN ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY 157-95 (1983). These agreements have
taken place in most regions of the ocean: the North Sea and Northwest Atlantic (12);
649
ments create a common zone wherein both parties claim sovereignty
over natural resources and establish a joint or condominium arrange-
ment for development of common mineral deposits, the great major-
ity are simply "agreements to agree" on the prospect of trans-
boundary petroleum discoveries. It has been suggested that in such
cases each side will have to demonstrate to the other that the field
underlies its territory, requiring considerable exploration and com-
mercial discoveries on both sides. If no agreement is reached, the
rule of capture will apply.198 Thus, in most of the existing offshore
agreements the effect of the political or spatial boundaries hinder
efficient management of the resource. In other contested offshore re-
gions, when no boundary settlement has been concluded, resource
claims likely will continue to act as an impediment to such
settlements.
While there is yet no clearly established international law on the
subject of such joint management schemes, analogies to both domes-
tic laws, which require cooperative production of common deposits,
and international law, with fisheries management and sharing of in-
ternational water courses are persuasive. It has been suggested that
state practice, as reflected in the common deposit resource adminis-
tration arrangements noted above, may support the emergence of a
customary rule of international law that would require states to co-
operate in exploration and exploitation of common deposits of
petroleum.199
NEW APPROACHES TO OCEAN BOUNDARY-MAKING
A Matter of Process
Delimitation of maritime boundaries involves either a process of
negotiation or adjudication by a third party. Delimitation, therefore,
involves mutual agreement between two sovereign powers to the dip-
lomatic process of treaty-making, or to the submission of the matter
to a third-party settlement procedure such as a boundary commis-
sion with either judicial, arbitral or advisory powers.2"'
Arbitration and judicial settlement, though similar in form, differ
significantly. An arbitrator, or arbitral tribunal, is chosen by the par-
ties. An arbitrator is not bound, as is his judicial counterpart, by the
the Persian Gulf and Red Sea (9); the Indian Ocean (5); the Mediterranean Sea (4); the
North Pacific (1); the Central Pacific (3); the South Pacific (3); South America (1); and
North America (1).
198. Morris, The North Sea Continental Shelf-Oil and Gas Legal Problems, 2
INT'L LAW. 191, 213 (1967).
199. See Lagoni, supra note 196, at 243.
200. A very good discussion of the international boundary delimitation process is
provided by A. CUKWURAH, THE SETTLEMENT OF BOUNDARY DISPUTES IN INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW (1967).
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tradition of legal precedent on a given subject of litigation such as
maritime boundary delimitation. Rather, arbitration enables the par-
ties to select persons who will decide the case based not so much on
their legal knowledge, but on some other skill which may be more
pertinent to the case. While an arbitrator normally cannot disregard
the law any more than a judge, he may be permitted a wider basis
than just the law from which to make a decision. In arriving at his
decision, an arbitrator may consider what is equitable in the circum-
stances rather than what is strictly legal; he is more suited to make a
decision ex aequo et bono than a judicial body.
Nonetheless, an arbitrator has only such power as the parties have
conferred in the document by which the dispute is referred. The ar-
bitration functions end when the case for which appointment was
made has been decided. And unless the parties have agreed other-
wise, an arbitral award is final.
Selection of the judicial forum to resolve an international bound-
ary dispute will bring the parties before the ICJ, governed by the
United Nations Charter20 1 and the Statute and Rules of the Interna-
tional Court of Justice.202 As a formal court, it is expected to base its
decisions upon the law. The court, in adjudicating matters, is bound
to apply: (1) international conventions; (2) international custom as
evidence of a general practice accepted as law; (3) the general prin-
ciples of law recognized by givilized nations; and (4) judicial deci-
sions and writings of publicists as a subsidiary means for determin-
ing law.20 3 The statute and rules of court now permit the formation
of a special chamber of three or more judges for dealing with a par-
ticular case. 04 These provisions allow the parties to suggest ICJ
judges to hear the case. It is not yet clear, however, whether the
court will always accede to the parties' wishes in the composition of
such a chamber. Nonetheless, precedent for using a special chamber
was established in the case between Canada and the United States
regarding the delimitation question in the Gulf of Maine.20 5
Both the judicial and arbitral procedures are attempts to settle
201. U.N. CHARTER art. 92, reprinted in 59 Stat. 1033 (1945).
202. U.N. CHARTER, Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 1, reprinted
in 59 Stat. 1055 (1945); see also DOCUMENTS ON THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUS-
TICE (S. Rosanne ed. 1979).
203. J. BRIERLY, supra note 23, at 353.
204. See U.N. CHARTER, supra note 201, art. 26, para. 2 to art. 29, & art. 31,
para. 4; see also id. arts. 17-18.
205. For a discussion and analysis of the new procedure, see McRae, Adjudication
of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine, 1979 CAN Y.B. INT'L L. 292; Christie,
supra note 85.
disputes by recourse to impartial and objective norms, thereby hope-
fully achieving equity if the dispute is too political to be settled by
direct negotiation. Positive and negative factors exist with respect to
each of the adjudication procedures.
2 0 6
Extended maritime jurisdiction now calls for delimination of ocean
areas never before in issue. Extended jurisdiction also may involve
consideration of new ocean uses in the waters superjacent to the con-
tinental shelf, fishing being the most important activity at this time.
For years, the ICJ has considered and established through its deci-
sions a basis for lawmaking with regard to delimitation of the conti-
nental shelf. In approaching the new delimitation issues, it might be
assumed that the court will apply the principles to all areas which
the parties ask to be delimited, not just where a conventional single
maritime seabed boundary is requested. Thus, the question is
whether these delimitation principles apply equally to water column
boundaries or to dual seabed and water column boundaries.
207
The LOS Convention will also have an impact on the dispute set-
tlement procedures available in boundary delimitation matters. Part
XV of the current treaty deals specifically with the procedures
which, if brought into force, will be binding between state parties
and available in maritime disputes. 208 The treaty reiterates the
states' obligation under article 33 of the United Nations Charter to
settle disputes by peaceful means. If settlement does not succeed,
state parties to the treaty will be subject to the specified
procedures.
20 1
Whether arbitral or judicial, adjudication as a means of settling
boundary issues between sovereign states is, in a sense, an extension
of the negotiation process through use of a specific tool or decision-
making machinery. Both negotiation and adjudication are part of the
"necessary process of adjustment" 10 that states must make in such
matters, although it is negotiation which can best reflect the compro-
206. The judicial process has been said to provide the following: (1) continuity and
uniformity of case law; (2) greater legal certainty; (3) continued development of interna-
tional law; (4) independence of the judges; (5) immediate availability; and (6) final and
binding settlements. 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 120-33 (R.
Bernhardt ed. 1981).
The arbitral process is said to provide: (1) a better arena for decisions ex aequo et
bono; (2) better nonbinding or compromise agreements where concessions on one hand
can be offset by concessions on the other; and (3) better suitability to consider new legal
issues. Id. at 142-46.
207. An ad hoc tribunal might consider itself less constrained by the history of
continental shelf delimitation and habit of thought, and more receptive to new arguments
based on the functional needs of the zone or zones sought to be delimited.
208. LOS Convention, supra note 5, arts. 279-320.
209. Id. arts. 279-99.
210. The process of boundary-making is analyzed in Munkman, Ajudication and
Adjustment-International Judicial Decision and the Settlement of Territorial and
Boundary Disputes, 1972-1973 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 1.
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mise leading to the best result-the best result being a boundary
that both parties can live with, and therefore administer, without the
having to designate a clear winner or loser."' The objective is, after
all, certainty and stability in the maritime community and interna-
tional relations.
Trends in State Practice
State practice in negotiating maritime boundary delimitation is a
matter of recent development and only now is a sufficient record be-
ginning to form from which certain trends may be perceived. Where
the parties place a high value on the economic and cultural signifi-
cance of the marine resources, historical uses, and overall socioeco-
nomic implications of a boundary settlement, a negotiating process
will produce more acceptable results for the parties. For example,
two fairly recent ocean boundary disputes have been negotiated
without rigorous application of the criteria established in continental
shelf adjudications. A settlement between Australia and Papua-New
Guinea was negotiated directly, 212 while another between Norway
and Iceland followed recommendations of a conciliation commis-
sion.21a Both settlements introduce some novel features to the exer-
cise of settling international ocean boundaries and it seems both will
succeed in reconciling political aspirations with the realities of the
unified and interdependent ocean system off their shores.
The delimitation agreement between Australia and Papua-New
Guinea was signed in 1978. It resolved a complex situation in a man-
ner in which the judicial or arbitral processes could not, because the
essential ingredient, international cooperation, was available. The
treaty dealt in a separate fashion with the different components of
the dispute, that is, sovereignty, fisheries, navigation, the effect of
islands, and the lifestyle and livelihood of local inhabitants. 14 In do-
ing so, it employed various features which do not usually accompany
a maritime boundary settlement: separate boundary lines for seabed
and fisheries jurisdiction; creation of a protected zone; and a formula
211. See generally id. at 1-11.
212. Treaty Between the Independant State of Papua-New Guinea and Australia
Concerning Sovereignty and Maritime Boundaries in the Area between the Two Coun-
tries including the area known as Torres Strait, and Related Matters, Dec. 18, 1978,
reprinted in 18 I.L.M. 291 (1979) [hereinafter cited as the Torres Strait Treaty].
213. Agreement on the Continental Shelf Between Iceland and Jan Mayen, Oct.
22, 1981, reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 1222 (1982).
214. See Torres Strait Treaty, supra note 212.
for sharing the commercial fishery harvest.215
Regarding the jurisdictional question, the treaty provides a prece-
dent for treating seabed and water column separately for delineation
purposes. The fisheries jurisdiction line is nearly identical with the
seabed line-except in Central Torres Strait where it diverges in rec-
ognition of the fishery's significance to the inhabitants of the Austra-
lian Islands.216 The protected zone was established to comprise of the
land, sea, airspace, seabed, and subsoil in a defined area.217 It was
established mainly to protect traditional ways of life and livelihood
as well as to protect the marine environment. 218 The jurisdictional
lines were also drawn through the protected area since both govern-
ments saw a need for certainty. Therefore, rather than creating a
common zone, management and administration remain in the pur-
view of the respective governments within their respective jurisdic-
tions. To ensure effective management, however, a Joint Advisory
Council was established, composed of representatives from Australia
and Papua-New Guinea, other regional governments, and traditional
inhabitants.219 The Council, however, has advisory powers only. To
anticipate uses of the ocean not directly related to seabed or fisheries
jurisdiction, such as pollution protection, energy production, artificial
islands, and other EEZ rights for the protected zone, the parties
have written in a "residual jurisdiction" clause.220
Another recent example of a cooperative approach to maritime
boundary delimitation is seen in the delimitation agreement relating
to seabed and fishery jurisdiction between Iceland and the island of
215. Commenting on the arbitral process and analyzing its results, a former mem-
ber of the Australian negotiating team has noted that
The rigid and single-focus approach of the initial round of negotiations, where
attention was given primarily to drawing a single maritime boundary, did not
lead to productive solutions. It was only after the adoption of an imaginative,
broadly focused approach that a solution acceptable to all the parties con-
cerned-not just governments but the people themselves-was achieved. The
Treaty represents an agreed solution that was reached without the assistance of
any third party. . . . [B]oth sides appreciated that no tribunal or court would
be able to provide a comprehensive solution that dealt satisfactorily with the
whole complex of issues involved.
Burmester, The Torres Strait Treaty: Ocean Boundary Delimitation by Agreement, 76
AM. J. INT'L L. 321, 328 (1982).
216. See id. at 337.
217. Torres Strait Treaty, supra note 212, art. 10(a).
218. Burmester, supra note 215, at 330.
219. Torres Strait Treaty, supra note 212, art. 19.
220. See Burmester, supra note 215, at 330-40 (extensive description of the pro-
tected zone and jurisdictional arrangements). The arrangements made in this case, while
consistent with the LOS Convention provisions, are clearly a precedent only where inter-
national relations permit the highest level of cooperation. Maritime boundary delimita-
tion consists of much more than settling on a line which will show on a map. The broad
basis for negotiating the Torres Strait boundary introduced many variables, but eventu-
ally, the line or lines drawn encompassed the various interests in what seems to be an
equitable solution.
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Jan Mayen. Jan Mayen is part of the territory of Norway and is
located 290 nautical miles northeast of Iceland in the Norwegian
Sea. 2 .1 In that dispute, the parties followed the recommendations of
a conciliation commission regarding the continental shelf boundary,
cooperative seabed and fishery arrangement. 2 The resolution in-
volved a pair of agreements. The first agreement, signed in May
1980, established the boundary between the economic zones of Jan
Mayen and Iceland, a process for fishery management, and a concili-
ation commission to recommend a continental shelf boundary.2 23 The
commission's recommendations, while required to be unanimous,
were not binding on the parties. 24 By the terms of the 1980 agree-
ment, the commission, in preparing recommendations, was to take
into account economic interests, geographical and geological factors,
and other special circumstances. 2 5 The second agreement, signed in
1981, followed the recommendations.2 2 6 It provides a continental
shelf boundary which is the same as the economic zone boundary
because the basis of such a division in conjunction with cooperative
seabed arrangements would constitute an equitable solution.2
Both the Torres Strait and Jan Mayen solutions provide some les-
sons and experience in the important area of international dispute
resolution of ocean boundaries. These recent examples are valuable
221. Agreement on the Continental Shelf Between Iceland and Jan Mayen, Oct.
22, 1981, reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 1222 (1982).
222. A thorough examination of this agreement, and the background and process
involved, is provided in Churchill, Maritime Delimitation in the Jan Mayen Area, 9
MARINE POL'Y 17 (1985).
223. Agreement Concerning Fishery and Continental Shelf Questions, May 28,
1980, Iceland-Norway, overenskomster medfremmede stater 912 (1980). The rationale
behind the conciliation process is :
The reason for choosing a conciliation commission to resolve the continental
shelf boundary problem appears to have been to transfer from the two govern-
ments to an independent body the burden of finding a practical solution to a
very delicate political problem and to permit the two governments to apply the
solution proposed by this body without suffering too serious political
repercussions.
Id. n. 14. The commission was composed of Ambassador Jens Evensen from Norway,
Ambassador Hans Andersen from Iceland, and Ambassador Elliot Richardson, a neutral
chairman, from the United States.
224. Id.
225. Id. art. 9.
226. See Report and Recommendations to the Governments of Iceland and Nor-
way of the Conciliation Commission on the Continental Shelf Area between Iceland and
Jan Mayen, 1981, reprinted in 20 I.L.M. 797 (1981).
227. See Churchill, supra note 222, at 21. For an analysis of the seabed arrange-
ments, see id. at 23-25. For an analysis of the cooperative fishery arrangements, see id. at
22-23.
for the perspective they give to both the process and the substantive
issues. Of particular significance are the comments on the relation-
ship of economic zone and continental shelf boundaries, cooperative
resource management, the relationship of socioeconomic interests to
maritime boundary delimitation, and the application of international
law to delimitation of dual maritime zones.228
CONCLUSION
Maritime boundaries and boundary-making are currently viewed
in terms of territory and fixed lines rather than in terms of systems
and managerial needs. The present view exists because maritime
boundaries have their origin in the land-based international bound-
ary concept, which carries with it the idea of divisiveness or separa-
tion. This sense permeates the methods and process of boundary-
making and is ultimately reflected in the nature and function of the
boundaries. As a result, politics in boundary-making dominates over
ecological, technological, and administrative needs. The division of
ocean space according to political ideas of boundary-making does not
always relate to logical ocean management purposes. As one scholar
has stated: "In the field of resource authority the functional irrele-
vance of territorial limits is especially marked. The logic of science
and technology wages unremitting war on arbitrary manmade limits
separating a zone of exclusive and comprehensive state authority
from the rest of the ocean. 229
The last decade has seen express recognition of unifunctional
ocean zones for separate control or management purposes. Thus, it is
now acceptable to assert jurisdiction on a basis other than territorial-
ity. The multifunctional EEZ, emerging in custom and recently codi-
fied in the new LOS Convention, is the culmination of this develop-
ment in international law. It has grown under pressure of the
technological advances which highlight the interdependencies of the
world community in the ocean. The acquisitive instinct of nations
has been directed during this period toward developing a limited
form of authority which will permit these nations to extend their ju-
risdiction to enclose a wider ocean area, and will satisfy the demands
of coastal states which look to the ocean primarily for its economic
value. The movement to enclose ocean space provides, paradoxically,
both an opportunity for good ocean management and a threat to the
equitable allocation of access rights and management authority. For
example, while the struggle conceptually and practically to develop
228. Jan Mayen still has an unresolved maritime boundary with Greenland, as it
lies about 250 nautical miles east of Greenland. This dispute is discussed also in Chur-
chill, supra note 222, at 31.
229. Johnston, Law, Technology and the Sea, 55 CALIF. L. REV. 449, 469 (1967).
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the concept of functional jurisdiction has tempered the territorial im-
perative, it has not removed it as a significant factor in the settle-
ment of maritime boundary disputes. Thus, essential to a positive
outcome of the enclosure movement is the development of a new atti-
tude of cooperation and a capability for coordination. This theme
runs throughout the recent LOS Convention which will govern rela-
tionships between states, and will also be important in intrastate
boundary-making.
These developments will require a new perception of maritime
boundaries. Perhaps a single maritime boundary between neighbor-
ing states will not be the best answer in all cases. In some circum-
stances, despite the administrative convenience of a single boundary,
reasons for more than one maritime boundary between states may
exist, each delimited on different principles to meet different man-
agement needs. Coastal states may have to think in terms of several
boundaries delimiting their reaches of territorial and functional ju-
risdiction with neighboring states, as well as with the international
community. Linear boundary concepts may have to be replaced by
three dimensional zonal concepts. Functional, extraterritorial zones
may be created not for one state, but for regions, and may be based
primarily on economic or administrative criteria. The criteria for de-
limiting such boundaries will be complex, as coastal-state jurisdic-
tion encroaches farther into the high seas and as more diverse uses
are made of the enclosed offshore areas. The attempt to reconcile
coastal-state political aspirations with an orderly division and effec-
tive management of the larger ocean areas will demand innovative
bilateral and multilateral arrangements to account for the multifunc-
tional basis of the EEZ and its dual nature, composed of seabed,
water column, and surface waters.
That boundaries should be delimited by agreement in accordance
with equitable principles is the current overriding principle or norm
for maritime boundary delimitation. The best boundaries in terms of
acceptability to the parties will continue to be those which are prod-
ucts of the diplomatic process rather than those resolved by third-
party settlement procedures. When third-party procedure is neces-
sary to resolve conflicts, it is likely that decisions will be based on the
recognized criteria in continental shelf delimitations-even when the
dispute involves the economic zone and living resources, or a dual
economic zone and seabed area. Certainly, the recent ICJ decisions
indicate that the legal tradition of judicial certainty, and the political
requirement for stability and finality in the boundary delimitation
process, will mean that division of functional zones will also be based
on already established rules for division of territorial or spatial
zones.230 The extended jurisdictions will see delimitation of ocean
boundaries become increasingly complex exercises. Either forum in
which the disputes are brought will have to expand the existing
framework for analysis.231
One way to expand the existing framework would be to view ocean
boundaries as conceptually unique from land boundaries, and to have
this view mark the whole process of boundary-making, from alloca-
tion to delimitation, demarcation, and administration. The existing
rules for maritime boundary delimitation were developed initially to
accommodate the political aspirations of industrialized maritime
powers. Thus, the criteria which relate almost exclusively to division
of the seabed of the continental shelf are concerned more with terri-
torial acquisition than with resource management. Rights to ocean
space allocated on that criterion focus on boundary location in the
offshore. Planning and management activity within such a spatial
framework becomes inhibited or constrained from dealing with func-
tional realities of the ocean system. If the goal under the emerging
international legal order is in fact to achieve rational management of
ocean space and resources, the significance of a maritime boundary
should lie in its function rather than in its location.
The primary objective of international land boundaries has been to
separate territory and legal systems which together constitute the
closed system of the sovereign state. The ocean, unlike a sovereign
state, is an open system and it is necessary to define ocean jurisdic-
230. See, e.g., Fisheries Jurisdiction (U.K. v. Ice.), 1974 I.C.J. 1 (Judgment of
July 25).
This dispute over the extension by Iceland of its fishery jurisdiction to 50 miles
presented the court with an opportunity to discuss the concept of an economic zone and
the socioeconomic implications of fishery conservation. Nevertheless, the analysis was not
provided; the court simply stated that for such a zone the parties should negotiate in
order to achieve an equitable solution.
In a more recent continental shelf case, the ICJ clearly refused to apply socioeconomic
factors in order to effect an equitable sharing of resources between Tunisia and Libya.
Nonetheless, as this was a continental shelf delimitation only, the application of the equi-
table principles established in earlier cases was correct. Tunisia/Libya Continental Shelf,
1982 I.C.J. at 60, para. 71; id. at 77, para. 107.
Even in the most recent ICJ decision, where the economic zone and fisheries were of
primary significance, the court did not integrate the old criteria with concerns specific to
delimitation of a functional economic zone to arrive at newly stated principles or theory
for delimiting these as opposed to territorial or political spatial zones. In Gulf of Maine,
the court indicated simply that the equity concept will prevail in delimiting economic
zones. The court stressed the need for convenience in administering dual boundaries for
the economic zone and seabed. It also relied heavily on the traditional geographic criteria
for division. Gulf of Maine, 1984 I.C.J. at 84-85, paras. 192-95.
231. A proposal for an expanded and uniform method of analysis employable in
boundary disputes is suggested in Charney, Ocean Boundaries Between Nations: A The-
oryfor Progress, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 582 (1984).
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tion with new concepts of boundaries and boundary-making in mind.
An inherent variability exists in the ocean system which must be
recognized, since uses, interests, conflicts, and managerial needs oc-
cur in different combination and varying intensity within and be-
tween the different physical and juridical zones. An ocean manage-
ment system by definition cannot be bound by absolute parameters
such as static boundaries. These absolutes do not permit the adjust-
ments to the management structure which are necessary for it to
conform to the needs presented by the physical, social, and techno-
logical subsystems which make up the total ocean system. The
closed-system concept of land boundaries cannot logically be im-
posed on the open-system of the ocean, as only by coincidence could
such imposition account for objective management needs in division
of ocean space.
The areas of the ocean made accessible by modern technology and
subjected to increased use are, by definition, frontiers. It is in these
areas historically that closed systems meet and confront each
other. 32 The concept of a frontier has always been zonal, giving it a
dynamic quality, and therefore, its boundaries can be territorial,
functional or simply symbolic. 233 By contrast, the linear concept of
boundary is static in nature, it must be territorial, and it must be
fixed and rigid. The linear concept fits the nature of a closed system
as it emphasizes "competition, separation, closure and intoler-
ance."2 34 An open system, on the other hand, emphasizes coopera-
tion. Open sytems will not be immutable, but they will have to be
logical. Conceptually, to the extent necessary for achievement of the
management function, a cooperative effort will effect the elimination
of the existing spatial boundary or boundary claim.
Short of a new global order, however, it appears that an equitable
and acceptable division of ocean space in a given ocean region will
involve operation of all three categories of maritime boundaries dis-
cussed in this Article: spatial, functional, and administrative. Recog-
nition of these three categories will serve both political and manage-
ment needs. The spatial boundary will recognize the political
division, and may play a role in the formula for revenue or resource
sharing in a boundary region. The functional boundary will recog-
nize coastal-state jurisdictional limits as well as the rights of mari-
time neighbors and the international community. The joint resource
232. See Kristoff, supra note 10.
233. See Strassoldo, supra note 1, at 87.
234. Id. at 86.
administration boundary will exist at different levels, either wholly
within one national jurisdiction, or in a transboundary ocean region
involving two or more national jurisdictions. It can achieve the divi-
sion necessary for effective ocean management. Also, it will vary ac-
cording to local management needs-such as the nature and location
of resources, the geographical location of the parties, and the institu-
tional and organizational structure selected for operation. The three
categories of maritime boundaries in fact compose a functional ap-
proach to the division of ocean space according to management
needs. A functional division requires more than drawing additional
lines in the offshore; most important, it involves an attitudinal as
well as an institutional factor. Such an approach might result in
something called marine boundary-making, connoting a three-di-
mensional concept, contrasted with maritime boundary-making
which traditionally has connoted a one-dimensional concept relating
to control and use of the surface, periphery or seabed individually.
The latter is linear and static, while the former is zonal and dynamic
in quality. In a sense, such criteria for boundaries in the ocean would
bring to a full circle the development of international boundary-mak-
ing, which on land, began with the concept of frontiers and zonal
divisions.
New ocean technology, resource needs, and economic require-
ments will continue to accelerate ocean development. The challenge
is to keep pace with these changes by developing a modern opera-
tional theory of ocean boundary delimitation in the legal, political
and administrative fields. The function of ocean boundaries has
changed, reflecting, as historically has been the case with interna-
tional land boundaries, a logical adjustment in the relationship be-
tween boundaries and national aspirations. Coastal states will con-
tinue to look to the ocean for resources, energy and livelihood.
Boundary-making and ocean management are essentially connected.
Thus, the primary function of ocean boundaries can now be de-
scribed as one of management.
